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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Los Angeles

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Rituals and Relatives:
A Study of the Social Uses of Wealth in Morocco

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy
in Anthropology

by

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[title page]

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[introductory p. iii]

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

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121 556 In industrial society the use of wealth to meet the needs of relatives or rituals is marginal and secondary to total expenditures. By contrast, such expenditures in a nonindustrial society may be the most important manner in which wealth is allocated. 121 556 433 Production in such societies is aimed primarily at satisfying needs arising from the activities and responsibilities induced by social and religious obligations. Distribution seeks to maintain the continuation of these activities and of the social relationships that they establish.

This study is an examination of how wealth is distributed in the Berber society of the Rif Mountains in Morocco. The fundamental feature of the Rif economy is that it is based on status. [554] The economy is one in which the deployment of resources rests primarily, though not exclusively, on imperatives derived from social factors. Exchanges, transfers, or consumption not directly

121 related to subsistence are dictated by a different order of
556 practical considerations and ideological commitments than
433 obtain as the dominating factors in industrial society.

121 It has been an on-going dispute in anthropological
114 literature about whether such an economy as that of the Rif
433 is susceptible to the same sort of treatment that marks the study of market-oriented, industrial society. Polanyi began the dispute by pointing out that the rules of choice upon which most economic theory rests are based on a particular social and economic model which has only limited applicability. He noted that the economic behavior of the participants of an industrial society was largely induced by the institution of the market. The difficulty in such economic analysis comes, of course, when we study societies in which the market is not the primary focal point of the economy.

121 In Rif society the marketplace is peripheral to the
433 economy. This condition is due in part to historical and
443 ecological factors which have influenced the evolution of a particular kind of social organization in which each local community has grown inwardly dependent on its own social and economic resources. The Rif has, until recently, been part
121 of the bled-as-siba, or the land outside the administrative
433 control of the Moroccan government. Thus, one of the major
642 social factors in the history of the Rif was the absence of centralized political authority. This lack of a political factor in integrating the economy has directly influenced the

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121 433 642 system by which resources are distributed. In the absence of such a factor, the economy developed as a reflection of the social organization wherein well-being depended on relatives, friends, the good-will of the spirits and God, all supporting one another.

121 [126] The data upon which this study is based were collected from two villages in adjoining tribes in the Central Rif. The economy of individual families within the villages was studied, as well as how these local communities articulate with each other and with the wider Moroccan social and economic structure. The principal foci of the investigation were the reciprocal relations between kinsmen and neighbors, the relation of property to prestige, ritual obligations and magical predilection, and the general effects of the indigenous system of social relations on the consumption and distribution of resources.

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INTRODUCTION

121 While few would disagree that systems of economics are different, the notion that economies might be propelled by sets of dynamics radically different from those that developed in Western economy is much less accepted. That this should be the case rests to a large degree on the development of economics as a science. Those people who accepted the calling to become economists were concerned with understanding and explaining the economic systems of which they were the most aware. Economic theory became synonymous with an analysis of industrial economies. Yet the majority of the human populace lived in societies that had been only marginally affected by the industrial revolution and there even were social enclaves which were still untouched by it. Only in recent years have a growing number of economists, anthropologists, and sociologists sought to understand the economic systems of these nonindustrial societies. The present work, as a description and analysis of how wealth is distributed in one such society, is intended to make a modest contribution to this understanding.

121 105 The society which we shall examine is that of the Berbers in the Central Rif of Morocco. The empire of Morocco itself has a lengthy history as a political unit. However, various mountain

121 and desert areas remained politically distinct from the Sultan's
105 regime. These areas, of which the Rif was one, were called the
bled-as-siba, or the land of insolence. In such areas there was
(571) no centralized political authority and whatever small degree of
security that existed came from a system of social relationships
whereby mutual assistance was expected and granted. The absence
of political integration at any higher than the local kin and
residence group was paralleled by an absence of extensive economic
121 integration. Not only political success but economic well-being
105 as well depended on relatives, friends and neighbors all support-
571 ing one another. Out of this developed an economic system based
602 on status. By "status" I mean an economy in which the deployment
433 of resources is based primarily, though not exclusively, on imper-
556 atives derived from social relationships and religious obligations.
In such societies wealth is expended on ceremonial activities, on
reciprocal obligations, on the gift and countergift. In an indus-
trial society there are analogous ceremonies and celebrations in
which wealth is spent on relatives and ritual. However, such
expenses are marginal to the amount of total outlay. Such expen-
ditures have proportionately little effect on the sum total of
wealth in comparison to expenditures connected with rational pro-
duction. By way of contrast, in a nonindustrial society social
expenditures of wealth can be the most important way in which
121 wealth is utilized. In a society heavily dependent on local ties,
105 on kin alliance, on neighborhood association, social activities
571 tend to be the essence and breadth of the group. Production is
602
433

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aimed primarily at satisfying needs and obligations which arise from these activities. Distribution supports the continuation of these activities and the social relationships that they help establish.

The central problem I have set for myself is to describe and explore all actual uses of wealth and types of exchanges in the Rif. To the economist orientated towards the analysis of the set of economic variables in an industrial society the method used here may seem distant from his customary procedure. There are few charts and no graphs. Whatever quantification that has been achieved is the result of rough scaling. Yet such estimates can give us an idea of the proportionate percentage of goods used for subsistence, for ceremonial purposes, for cash from the market, and so forth. By analyzing the relative importance of each type of expense one can grasp the dynamics by which the system is driven.

As I shall point out in the body of my thesis, the conditions in which this economic system developed lie in the fact that the Rif was part of the bled-as-siba and, as such, it was socially, politically, and economically detached from the rest of Morocco. Under such circumstances, the Rif society developed its own system of exchanges as a relatively successful adaptation to the absence of political integration. While political conditions have radically altered over the past few decades, the social relationships, traditional obligations and expectations have remained as major organizing principles of the Berber society.

121 Production and distribution continue to be geared to a series of
433 goals arising out of the status economy. These goals involve
128 obligations attendant to life crises (Chapter 3), incumbent on the correct religious performer, or to placate the spiritual world (Chapter 4), to enhance status and/or acquire allies (Chapter 5). The relationship of the Riffian to the marketplace is described in the final chapter.

101 The field work upon which this study is based was carried
114 out in the Province of Alhucemas in northern Morocco between June of 1965 and November of 1966. The initial month and a half was spent in the port city of Alhucemas arranging necessary papers and working on the local Berber dialect. The following six months were spent among the Beni Wariyaghar in a location of scattered homesteads on the Wariyaghar-Igzinnayen border. The first quarter of 1966 was spent recovering from illness. May to October was spent in a compact village in the tribe of the Ibuqquyen. Field work was terminated in November.

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Chapter 1

SOCIAL HISTORY

133 The Rif is a chain of rugged mountains stretching along the Mediterranean coastline from the Strait of Gibraltar to the Moulouya River. Composed almost entirely of sedimentary and metamorphic rock, it is an extension of the Cordillera Penibotica of Spain. While the mountains are somewhat lower than those of the Atlas, they are just as steep. The invaders of Morocco invariably skirted the Rif and proceeded through the Taza Corridor. If the mountains are foreboding, the coastline is no less so. [504] The entire stretch from Río Martin to Melilla is devoid of ship shelter except for the break in the bay of Alhucemas, the small cove at Puerto Capaz, and the deltas of Wad Lao, Rhis, Nekor, and Bados.

133 131 The area which will be discussed is located in the center of this mountain chain in what is now called the Province of Alhucemas. The Tamazight-speakers of this region lived, until very recently, in a social and economic backwash. The presence of a rugged, inaccessible coast isolated them from Mediterranean contact except for the few points mentioned above. The mountain chain, on the other hand, served as an effective barrier to the interior of the country. The Rif was thus isolated from the rest of Morocco by natural boundaries. The social and political consequences of this shall be discussed below.

633 [504] The area is administered today from the small port and provincial capital of Alhucemas. The growth of this urban center, fishing port, and tourist attraction is but a recent [175] phenomenon. The city, founded in 1925 with the invasion of a Spanish fleet, has been the focal point for whatever innovation that has occurred in the Central Rif in this century.

133 361 Directly behind the city of Alhucemas is a flat plain. Although the land here is rich it was uninhabited prior to the Spanish because the terrain was indefensible during times of feuds. The original population was situated in the foothills [712] and higher mountains. Here homesteads were scattered and since they also served as garrisons or fortresses they were located on hills or ridges which could be defended militarily.

133 The area is not well served by rivers, the principal ones being the Rhis and the Nekor. The former rises in the Sonhaja area and empties into the Mediterranean at Alhucemas. The latter starts in Igzinnayen territory to flow along the border of the Beni Wariyaghar and the Beni Tuzin, emptying into the bay at [312] [161] Alhucemas. Both these rivers and their tributaries are used for irrigation and the population density is higher along them. There are also a good many natural springs (generally regarded as holy sites) and wells have been successfully dug in some of the valleys.

132 Rainfall varies annually and at times disastrously. At the weather station in Alhucemas during the decade 1946-1955, rainfall ranged from 8.5 inches to 16.9 inches. Although the

132 mean would be somewhat higher in the highlands, the range of
[243] variation would be as great. Since the economic backbone of the area is the dry farming of cereals, low rainfall or drought causes serious difficulties.

175 The history of the Rif presents us with the strange paradox that it is better documented for the eleventh and twelfth centuries than for the nineteenth. We have several written chronicles of the Arab city states established along the Mediterranean, such as Nekor which drops out of history in the eleventh century, and Bades which was captured by the Spanish in the sixteenth century. Of the Berbers in the hinterland we have
[113] little material with the exception of el-Badisi's Lives of the Saints of the Rif (French translation by Colin, 1926) dated 1311, and el-Bekri's Description de l'Afrique septentrionale from the
[131] eleventh century. El-Bekri notes that already in that time most of the present tribes of the Rif were located in their present
[648] sites (Michaux-Bellaire, 1925: 180-181). Between these accounts, fragmentary at best, and the uncritical chronicles of Spaniards leading punitive expeditions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Riffian history is rather blank.

175 Geographical circumstances made the Central Rif peripheral
648 to most events going on in Morocco. Only with the insistence of the Spanish government did the Moroccan Sultan send an expedition into the Rif in the late nineteenth century to punish the Ibuqquyen for piracy. During the early years of the present

century a pretender to the Sultan's throne, Bou Hmara, seeking to consolidate his position in the north, invaded the Rif. He was halted in 1908 on the shores of the Nekor by the Beni Wariyaghar (Maldonado, n.d.:486) who united not to save a crown but to preserve their own autonomy.

What we do know of the early history of the Rif is not so much definite historical material whereby one can discuss the contents of an event and its eventual repercussions, but rather the sociocultural background of the tribes.

Regarding the original populating of the Rif there is no definite information. The people who live there today may have lived there prior to the Arabic invasion of the seventh century and certainly did live there by the second invasion of the eleventh century according to el-Bekri's account. They may have been pushed into this area by the first Arabic invasion or by other Berber tribes at earlier dates. The ruggedness of the terrain and the difficulty of earning even a subsistence suggests that migration to the Rif was not voluntary. The Rif mountains hardly constitute a promised land. Though it is only conjecture, I suspect that the Rif was first populated by small groups of kinsmen living in the lowlands of the Taza Province who were forced because of the blood feuds to leave their original homestead and take up residence in these inaccessible areas. There is a certain justification for this belief since the present population distribution in the Rif is due mainly to small segments of original lineages fleeing the consequences of the blood feud.

175 The social facts are, however, somewhat clearer. The
648 Berber tribes of the Central Rif were a part of the bled-as-siba,
651 or that area in which the central Moroccan government (bled-al-makhzen) failed to exercise effective control. The boundary between the one and the other was determined by whether within the area in question the makhzen could or could not collect taxes. If a tribe had voluntarily or involuntarily submitted to the payment of tribute, there would be a royal intermediary, a qaid, to collect revenue. In the Rif such dominancy was not present until the Spanish, or in the case of the Igzinnayen, the French, were able to assert supremacy.

619 A complimentary feature of the bled-as-siba, at least as
(648) it obtained in the Central Rif, was that not only were the tribes independent of the makhzen but within any particular tribe itself, the internal segments of which it consisted were independent in most instances from one another. There was no tradition of centralization in this region. Each tribe (taqbitch) was divided
619 into segments of varying degrees of inclusiveness. The maximal
613 lineages or ar-rba agreed that they belonged to a common social group which was socially, geographically, and to some extent linguistically distinct from other taqbitch. This social entity was evoked more in terms of space than of time. If one lived within the spacial limits of the tribe one was a member of that group. However, rights and duties within the taqbitch were nebulous and a Riffian would only use his tribal identity to someone who was unacquainted with local political sub-divisions. As a

619 temporal entity the tribe was only rarely a corporate group as in
613 times of invasion. Even on these occasions tribal-wide support was difficult to solidify since each lineage spokesman had the option of joining in or staying out. In a land where personal and familial enmity was so intense, it was not uncommon for a tribal segment to remain neutral or migrate away, temporarily or permanently, to avoid making common cause with tribal affiliates who might murder them. There were even occasions in which tribal segments allied themselves with an enemy tribe.

619 The social division which had a more frequent jural function was the ar-rba, the group which Coon designates as a 'canton.' The term itself comes from the Arabic and Berber word for the number four. The epistemology of the term is obscure. Some tribes, such as the Igzinnayen and Beni Wariyaghar, contain four of these subdivisions. Others, such as Thimsaman, contain two, and some taqbitch, such as Ibuqquyen and Tafarsith, are not divided into ar-rba at all. In these tribes the term for taqbitch and for ar-rba are used to designate the same set of people. The ar-rba contained both related families and strangers who had purchased land within the territorial limits of the ar-rba. Spacial proximity rather than kinship seems to have been the organizing principle. In tribes covering vast amounts of territory the ar-rba was a territorial division to meet whatever jural responsibilities which occurred within its limits. The smaller the number of tribesmen and of spacial expanse, the less necessary it was to have these subdivisions. Within the ar-rba

Within the ar-rba
619 there was a council (jemas) held irregularly to discuss and
[628] settle judicial matters generally pertaining to the blood feud.
[554] Only the more important families within the ar-rba had representation on the council.

613 The first social unit which is directly reflective of kin ties is the dharfiqth. Whereas tribal and ar-rba names refer to place names generally, the dharfiqth invariably carries the name of a real person, i.e. Aith 'Abdallah or Aith al-Qasim. The members of this group consider that they have a common agnate although they may not be able to demonstrate the genealogical linkage to this ancestor. The group theoretically includes all the sons of the founding ancestor and their offspring. Some dharfiquin seem to have increased in number and power while others grew smaller either through decimation in feuds or from splintering into rival dharfiquin. Solidarity seems to have rested mainly on sentiment, and in such an explosive atmosphere this is perhaps too fragile a mechanism for maintaining agnatic descent groups.

613 The dharfiqth is made up of a varying number of jujgu
596 which are localized patrilineal extended families which may be regarded as minimal lineages. Each ijujga consists of a man, his wife or wives, his married sons and their wives and children, along with his unmarried sons and daughters. When the referent of the ijujga dies, all his sons form separate and new jujgu. The composition of the ijujga is today an idealization since few
000 households contain the above list of relatives. Neolocality is

591 Neolocality is
178 the preferred residence pattern today and matrilocality is permitted.

613 The rights and duties of these descent groups are rather
596 more fluid than is generally reported for African societies. As
602 I shall discuss in Chapter 5, the principle of patrimony does not
571 rule out other types of kinship alignment nor are kin ties the only form of relationship. Each community is made up of both kinsmen and non-kin with relations based on economic association, friendship or communal obligations.

178 In the Rif today the jural authority of the upper levels of segmentation[1] has been superseded by bureaucratic organization.
[613] However, in the lower rungs such as the dharfiqth and ijuiga
[596] traditional social obligations are still extant.
[602] The final social unit in the Rif is the local community
621 or dchar, a neighborhood association both both kinsmen and non-kin (called douar in other Berber areas). The size of such a community varies considerably. If we take the tribe of Ibuqquyen
621 we find that it is divided into three fractions. In a survey I
619 took in 1966, the fraction of Tagidit had 14 dchars, the largest
162 having a population of 707 persons living in 114 different homesteads, while the smallest consisted of 94 persons living in 47 households. In the fraction of Axgar, the largest was 607 people living in 107 homes and the smallest was 163 people in 34 homes. In Izmourin, the most populous of the three fractions, the largest dchar had 1,509 people living in 268 homes and the smallest had 228 living in 35 homes.

1. [i.e., the ar-rba or tribal levels--Analyst]

621 623 Each dchar has its own jemas to which all adult men are theoretically eligible. Its political powers are rather negligible at present and jemas meetings are held infrequently. The jemas meets to make decisions on the allotment of the community for the upkeep of the local mosque or to take up a local subscription to buy an animal for ceremonial purposes or to voice community feeling towards proposed projects of the provincial government. Each dchar is administered by a moqaddem who is 621 622 657 appointed by the national government. While the appointment is made by the government it is always of a local notable, prominent and acceptable at the local level. The moqaddem 622 631 619 may and usually does have administrative responsibility over more than one dchar. Taking again the Ibuqquyen as our example we find that four moqaddems of the fraction of Izmourin are responsible for 9 dchars, that the three of Axgar are in charge of 13 dchars, and the two of Tagidit for 14 dchars.

623 [554] Although theoretically every adult male is supposed to have a voice in the local council, in practice the younger men or the poor do not play a very active role and decisions are for the most part guided by the local notables. In traditional days, 623 198 before pacification, these councils had a great deal of political power and were active in adjudicating quarrels, property settlements, and so on. Since these functions have now been assumed [657] by officials of the Moroccan government, the council's power has been considerably reduced although its decisions still carry a moral authority of some substance.

621 The dchar then is a neighborhood association which is made up of all the adult permanent residents. Its functions which formerly held considerable political importance have now been reduced to an association of mutual support and assistance. It is important economically in such activities as maintenance of the local mosque and collecting sufficient funds to support local ceresonies. This latter function shall be taken up in greater detail in Chapter 5.

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Chapter 2

LIVELIHOOD

243 The primary economic activity in the Central Rif is the cultivation of barley. The agricultural cycle is marked by the [221] planting and harvesting of this crop. Ploughing begins during the months between October and January depending on the occurrence of the first rain which is necessary to soften the soil. [407] Breaking the soil is done by wooden ploughs though the blades are made of metal. The terrain is first weeded and cleared of small rocks by the children of the family. Then the father, an 243 492 older son or a hired man commences the ploughing. Two animals, one on each side of the plough, are used. Mules are preferred, but rarely does a man have two. Thus, there is a bizarre mixture of animals including combinations of donkeys, cows and mules. The value of animals on the market is at its highest in this season since everyone needs them for ploughing.

243 After the land has been ploughed by the animals it is [412] broken even finer by the use of a hand hoe. When the land has been sufficiently prepared, the seed is sown by hand. Once the barley has been planted there is no further care of the fields. The crop is dry farmed and its yield depends entirely on the amount of rainfall it receives during the winter.

243 While barley is the predominant crop, maize is an important secondary one. Wheat and rye are also grown but the latter is held in low esteem as a food product[1] and the former does not grow successfully on the thin residual soil of the region. In
241 [312] those areas where there are rivers or streams, small gardens are maintained by irrigation canals. In these are cultivated potatoes, tomatoes, onions, garlic, squash, turnips, green peppers and mint.

245 In addition to the grains, maize, and small vegetable gardens, many households also have orchards of fruit and nut trees. Fig, lemon, orange, pomegranate, walnut, almond, and olive trees are common. In some areas grapes are also cultivated. Around each house is a grove of prickly pears which serves not only as a means of preserving privacy, but also as a source of food. These products not only supplement and add variety to the regular diet but in the case of oranges, almonds
[258] and grapes serve as cash crops. The olives are pressed by the
[262] women to provide crude cooking oil. Nuts, dried grapes and figs
[221] are an important winter food reserve. The work of pruning and grafting goes on during the months of February-March-April.

243 In early summer harvesting begins. Both men and women engage in this activity, the men doing the reaping with hand

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[829] [1]Coon (1931:47-48) states that rye is highly praised by the Riffian but that since the Arabs scorn it as a foodstuff the Berbers are ashamed to admit its worth.

243 sickles and the women carrying the grain stalks to the threshing areas. The threshing floors are generally merely a circle of dirt ground, although in some areas they are paved. The stalks [231] are placed on this circular floor and mules, donkeys, or cattle are driven about inside the circle, trampling the grain and separating it from the chaff. The grain is further refined by hand-winnowing done by the women. The straw is accumulated in circu- [231] lar stacks to be preserved as food for the animals during the winter months. When relatives have worked a common piece of land 243 465 the yield is divided by measuring off the appropriate amount of grain in straw baskets. If the division is on a one-for-one basis, each alternate basket will go to one of the parties. If the division is at some other ratio, the number of baskets will [427] accordingly be at that ratio. If the land was ploughed, planted and harvested by a akharmas, a sharecropping laborer, the owner of the land will receive four bushels out of every five, the remaining fifth going to the akhammas.

241 Throughout the summer the vegetables, fruits and nuts are harvested as they come ripe. In late summer and early autumn the [465] maize and grapes are harvested. Once again, if the labor of several families or of akhammas has been involved, straw baskets are used to allot out to each man his appropriate portion. It is 585 221 during this period, in the months of August and September, that [241] weddings are held. The agricultural cycle has been completed and there is spare time to arrange the necessary items for a wedding. Also this is the period in which the optimum amount of food is

585 221 available and the weather is most propitious for holding the giant outside wedding ceremonies common in the Central Rif.

221 241 After the wedding season, the cycle resumes and with the first autumn rains the land is ploughed anew for the next crop. [461] This process begins for most men when they are but 12 or 13, and continues with monotonous regularity until they die or become too [777] enfeebled to do the work. Perhaps it is this unending sameness which contributes to some of the fatalistic beliefs held by the tribesmen.

231 Although the Berber of the Central Rif mountains is primarily an agriculturalist, he also maintains a stock of assorted animals. Most families have a herd of goats, a few sheep, and some chickens. If the household has some wealth they will also [262] have a cow and either a mule or donkey. Although livestock is not the primary food source, it is a very important secondary supply, providing milk, butter, eggs, and meat. Livestock is [556] also an important source of material and social wealth and of [554] prestige. Animals serve as reserve capital on the hoof which [471] can be converted into hard cash at the weekly market. Perhaps 231 most important is the ritual value of animals. While grain is 796 vital for subsistence there is very little social significance attached to it. On the other hand, while animals are secondary to subsistence they are the essence of the ceremonial and ritual life of the Riffian. There are practically no communal events,

231 There are practically no communal events,
796 and few pertaining to individual life crises, which can be accom-
782 plished without the sacrifice of an animal. Perhaps this social
231 and ceremonial significance of animals among a sedentary, horti-
182 cultural people can be explained by the fact that they live by a
[771] religion whose manifest forms of spiritual observation developed among pastoral transhumants. I do not mean to imply that goats and sheep are as important in the lives of the Berbers as are camels to the Bedouin or cattle to the Nuer. The economic base of the Riffian is perhaps too diversified for such psychological domination to take place. Nor were there the same sort of feuds between goat herdsmen as exist with camel or cattle. If, however, we regard livestock as merely secondary food sources in the economic sphere, we shall miss its importance to the social life and institutional structure of the Rif and hence misevaluate its true economic significance.

121 In the discourse which follows I shall be dealing with economic units of extremely small scale. To a reader oriented to the scale of economic transaction which takes place in post-industrial society, the examples used may seem irrelevant to an examination of economic organization. My problem, nonetheless,
433 impels me to use such examples. Waterson (1962:4) estimates that
435 the annual per capita output of the fellah in traditional
[191] Moroccan agriculture is 30,000 francs or $60. In the Rif, which is regarded as one of the poorest sections of Morocco,
231 the figure is probably lower. Yet my data on the average prices
435

231 of livestock during normal market conditions show a mule to be
435 worth $100 or more, a donkey between $40 and $60. Cows range
from $50 to $70, and bulls upward to $100. Rams sell for $20
[454] to $30, and goats for $10. Given the resources of the Riffian,
expenditures of this magnitude represent expensive investments.

6: Joseph E-5 (1965-1966) 1975 MX3 Rif MX3

Chapter 3

VARIETIES OF SOCIAL EXPENSE: BIRTH AND MARRIAGE

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437 The Riffian then is an agriculturalist, a fellah, who keeps small herds of livestock. Our problem is what does he do with his herd and his cereals once the subsistence needs of himself and his family have been met. If he followed Smith's dictum he would 'by instinct' seek out another individual with whom he could exchange his superfluous product in order to gain a profit. Such exchanges do, of course, take place. Ecological differentiation, for one factor, causes the exchange of special objects from one region to another. Occupational specialization requires the fellah to seek out opportunities for exchanging his produce in the most opportune way in order to acquire services and goods outside his range of competence. The question however is, are these forms of exchange the most frequent, do they account for the most significant amount of distribution, and are they culturally or ideologically the most valued types of exchange? If the answer is no, then we must seek out what sort of exchanges do fulfill the above functions. The study of the circulation of goods must proceed sui generis.

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556 In order to derive the relative importance of the various uses of wealth in the Rif, I shall commence with an analysis of the distribution of wealth related to some of the life crises of the Berber.

121 [553] [585] the Berber. Of the various steps that one passes through, domestic celebrations of any magnitude occur only with the naming of [844] [852] [764] the child and marriage. Birth itself, first haircut, circumcision and death are attended by very unelaborate ceremonies.

The ceremonial activities surrounding birth are rather 844 insignificant. When the woman is on the point of delivery she sends for the neighborhood women and for a midwife. Relatives [602] may come and often do although they are not required to. Coon [782] (1931:123) states that on this day a sheep or goat is sacrificed. [556] [574] While wealthier families may offer an animal to feed the assembled guests, it is not ritually incumbent upon them to do so. However, the occasion of the birth of a male child, especially a first-born boy, is one of great joy and such hospitality is not uncommon among those who can afford it.

553 574 602 [114] Coon may have been confusing the birth with the naming ceremony, which occurs seven days later and which is socially the second most important initiation ceremony in the society. On this day the father invites all the brothers and sisters of 553 574 602 431 his wife as well as his own siblings. This is a time during which familial solidarity is required and all close kin of the child on both his mother's and father's sides are expected to be present and to offer gifts. The amount of gift is not fixed but is determined by the economic level of the giver and by previous obligations established by gifts that the giver has received from the parents. These presents include a small amount of money, 20 to 50 kilos of barley flour, a dozen loaves of bread, several

553 cones of sugar, and a few kilos of tea. For a man, especially
574
602 father's brother and mother's brother, not to attend this cere-
431 mony and offer gifts is regarded as a public repudiation of the
[578] family. On the other hand, the gift maintains the giver's right to aid and mutual support by placing these obligations on the recipient.

553 At approximately ten o'clock on the morning of this day
782 the mother brings the child out onto the patio and the father sacrifices a ram. As he kills the beast he whispers into its ear three times, "Your name is...," calling it the same name as that of the newborn child. Only by propitiating the gods in such a manner can the child be properly baptized.

553 On the evening of this day, an open invitation is extended
574 to everyone in the dchar. However, since anyone who comes is
621 expected to bring gifts of barley, bread, and money, the actual number of guests will include only a restricted group. Everyone who attended the wedding ceremony of the parents is expected to be present. The celebration for a child of a rich man is the

553 best attended, since he is expected to provide large amounts of
556
574 food and often hires professional musicians and dancing boys. Such festivities are the chief and most appreciated form of public entertainment to the Riffian. A more important factor, how-
[571] ever, is that the wealthier a man is, the more social contacts and obligations he has formed. Of course, rivals for superiority often do not attend the ceremony, using such occasions to empha-
553 size their independence and competitiveness. The naming ceremony

553 is, however, only a descriptive prelude to the much more elaborate presentations which occur in relation to nuptial ceremonies.

585 114 The marriage ceremony is probably the most socially significant public ceremony which takes place in the Rif. The spectacle and complexity of Berber marriage have prompted numerous studies, of which Westermarck (1914) is the most complete and Maunier (1927) the most useful. A rather detailed description of the ceremony among the Beni Iznassen, a tribe neighboring the Rif, is given by Renisio (1932). Accounts for the Rif proper are given by Coon (1931) and Hart (1956). My own description is not at odds with any of the above but the point of view differs from all except possibly Maunier.

585 The marriage process can be broken into three separate divisions of time and into the associated ceremonies and rituals [584] which accompany these three periods. The first period, which takes place prior to the wedding, is one in which the preliminary negotiations take place between the parents of the prospective couple. The second division is the actual wedding festival itself, which takes place over a two or three-day period. The final division is the ceremony held on the seventh day after the marriage. I shall discuss each of these periods in terms of the strategy of bargaining, the expenses entailed by social and religious imperatives, and the function of gift and countergift.

584 In the initial period negotiations are conducted between the male relatives on both sides, the most prominent participants being the fathers of the prospective bride and groom or, if they

584 are not available, the father's brother. The negotiations may have begun at the request of a young man who has already selected a girl, but more likely they have been initiated by the parents without the knowledge of the children involved. The more isolated [178] [621] and traditional the dchar, the more prevalent is the exclusion of the children themselves. This, as well as the subsequent description and analysis, applies only to initial marriages. Men with [595] multiple wives generally arrange all subsequent matrimonies. The [369] urban context in the city of Alhucemas is different in that the majority of young men are cash earners capable of arranging their own marriage. Needless to say, no matter what the context, the [593] man attempts to have parental approval. An open break with one's family carries with it a high burden of social shame and inconvenience.

The opening of negotiations is very delicate. Men attempt 584 581 to marry their offspring in the most advantageous manner, either to families who are superior to their own or to equals. The strategy of choice is better understood when we recall the historical context of the Rif. As noted in Chapter 1, Rif society [571] was acephalous with a tendency toward anarchy. In such a situ- [602] ation each family sought security through a system of alliances based in part on kin ties. Although today internal security is [178] guaranteed by the national government, there is still a heavy [571] overlay of the ideology of alliance in influencing marriage, based on social and economic conditions. The shorfa or des- 565 582 792 cendents of the Prophet are still supposed to marry only into

565 582 792 other shorfa families. However, the shorfa have never been a solid social class in the Rif because of the large and economically varied numbers of people who claim, with varying degrees of reliability, such descent. Whatever endogamy that exists [556] among the shorfa is between shorfa who are also men of means. Such families as possess both qualities do have a marked propensity towards marrying among themselves. There is also a 556 565 582 class of men who own more land than the average and do not do their own labor but hire others to do it. There is then a very loosely defined economic class which tends to marry within its own circle. It is very rare for a family of this class to marry a girl to a family with small holdings who hire out as laborers. They prefer to marry shorfa women, thus raising their prominence in both economic and religious terms. The majority of people, the small landholders who do their own labor or hire out to others, do not have any noticeable pattern of preference.

582 Aside from a loose class endogamy, marriage in the Rif is relatively freely constructed. There is no guiding principle whereby people placed in certain structural relationships marry because of their location within the structure. Aside from incest rules which prohibit marriage with one's mother, father's sister, mother's sister, sister's daughter, brother's daughter, wife's mother, stepdaughter, grandmother, daughter, foster sister, or any child who was suckled by mother, marriage can be contracted with anyone inside or outside the dchar.[1] Within any one dharfiqth

[114] [1] Murdock's information (1959:117) that Riffians do not marry their father's brother's daughter is inaccurate, although the percentage

582 Within any one dharfiqth
[613] there are both endogamous and exogamous marriage. The same holds
582 true for the fraction although endogamy at this structural level
619 is probably more pronounced. There is no prohibition against marriage into other tribes and such marriage seems more a function of proximity than any cultural rule. There is more tribal exogamy between Ait Kamara in the Beni Wariyaghar and Izmourin in Ibuqquyen or Arba Turirt in Beni Wariyaghar and Igzinnayen than
565 for the respective tribes as a whole. Proximity tends to be less
582 important among the notables who have a smaller pool of prospects from which to draw.

582 The main structural consequence of the absence of pro-
602 scriptive rules is that there is no common genealogical unity
611 at any level of social organization beyond the extended family. Since recruitment into the descent group does not follow any single principle, there is a weakening of the patrilineal prin-
611 ciple. Although rights in property and children almost always
602 remain in the patrilineal line, the organization of the society is not exclusively or even preponderantly based on this principle. A man's matrilineal relatives (who may with cousin marriage also be related through patrilineal lines), as well as non-related friends, neighbors, and patrons, may receive equal or greater emphasis. A further weakening of the patrilineal principle was

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582 of such marriages does not appear to be high. It might be more
114 correct to state that FaBrDa marriage is neither a preferred nor a completely approved union. As one young man expressed to me
[829] with disgust: "It's a custom of the Arabs. But it is wrong. It's like marrying your sister." The comment was made as we prepared to attend exactly such a union.

178 A further weakening of the patrilineal principle was
611 that before pacification, one of the most common kinds of quar-
602 rels was between brothers over irrigation rights. In such situ-
578 ations it was not unnatural to emphasize alliances through matri-
lineal lines.

121 I think that the principle of unilineality is not as
611 important in the Rif as it is ascribed to be in many nonindus-
[571] trial and nonliterate societies. Social alliances are calculated
to bring the maximum social value to both parties. While this
makes for difficulty at the analytic level in interpreting the
structural unity of the society and the interrelationship of its
parts, it does not much bother the Riffians who need only conform
to a workable system and not an anthropological model.

582 While marriage rules are not as rigid as in many non-
584 industrial societies, they are likewise not random. One must
decide whether to marry a relative and by doing so reinforce
bonds of prior common interest or marry a nonrelated person and
set up new bonds. There are compelling reasons for making either
type of alliance and the final decision is made on the basis of
an evaluation of these factors as well as personal preference on
the part of the boy and girl.

584 While most marriages are arranged by the parents, the
couple, especially the boy, do have some role in the matter
should they refuse to be passive. Daughters are rarely con-
sulted as to preference, although fathers are not as autocratic
as often depicted in Berber ethnographies. A girl's most likely
chance of avoiding a marriage in which she has no choice is to

584 pick out a prospective husband and let it be known among her
circle of girl friends that she likes him. Within the community
[521] such information is conveyed through gossip so that it becomes
knowledge among the women in both the girl's and boy's family.
If the boy is interested he may ask his mother or grandmother
to urge the male members of his family to talk to the girl's
father. Such procedure occurs only among the poor, who are,
however, the majority.

584 Men have more say about their prospective spouse because
562 of the fear of divorce. Since the male has the option of initi-
586 ating divorce proceedings, it is thought unwise to force a son
into a marriage that he strenuously opposes, since all the advan-
tages that accrue from the match are terminated at its rupture.
584 Westermarck (1914:50-51) notes that among the Beni Wariyghar if
[782] a man wishes to marry a girl and his father opposes the match,
[571] the son can sacrifice a sheep outside the parental home, placing
an obligatory duty ('ar) on the father. He remarks that the
Riffians do not regard this as a good method for obtaining a
wife. I encountered no case of this occurring. I do know of
[593] instances in which the son has married against the father's will
[464] and has been kicked off the land. In such cases the men work as
[420] akhammas or migrate abroad in search of wage labor. In such cir-
cumstances shame is thought to fall on both parties.

584 Aside from the preferences of the couple, it is supposed
581 that a certain amount of advantage stems from marrying a relative
582 which is counterbalanced by disadvantages. My informants agreed

584 that the following factors are evaluated in each case.

581 Advantages in marrying a relative are:

582 1. You don't fight over whose family is superior.

2. You know the girl beforehand and have a fair idea of what sort of a person you are getting.

3. It is a simpler property arrangement.

4. Your family already knows the girl, presumably likes her, and there is no problem of an outsider coming in and being picked upon by the women of the household.

5. If a husband is fighting with his wife, the common family relatives will pressure him into treating the woman better in order to decrease the possibility of divorce.

On the other hand, there are a countervailing series of factors which discourage marriage to a relative:

1. It is harder to be in love with or be attracted sexually by a woman with whom you have grown up and whom you regard as a sister.

2. It is socially and economically advantageous to spread out one's contacts through alliances with non-relatives.

3. With an outsider, a non-related wife, the husband has more power because his wife does not have any natural allies with the household or the family.

4. Although property arrangements are more complicated, there is a greater possibility of bringing additional property into the family with an outside wife than there is with a marriage within the family.

581 While such exchange as emerges from marriage defies the
571 making of pronouncements about the guiding principle behind alliance in purely structural terms, it does expose the factor that the distribution of human resources is influenced by both social and economic calculation of a given situation.

584 Negotiations are always begun on the side of the prospective groom. No father would attempt to initiate negotiations

584 on behalf of his daughter, although within the informal network of female rumors the father's disposition in the matter may be learned. Even before negotiations begin there is a prelude in 584 431 which gifts are given to the father of the prospective bride. Among the humblest families there is a period in which one brings over a cone of sugar, a block of rock salt, some kilos of tea, or a chicken. These gifts are regarded as friendship gifts in order to evaluate how the family might look towards a match. During such a period nothing is spoken of marriage and there is no obligation on either party from these gifts. Attitudes are being tested and if the result appears to be negative the process ends at this point. There is nothing to prevent a father from receiving gifts of this sort from several prospective families and, indeed, they may become competitive, although this is frowned upon. Naturally, the wealthier a man, the more expensive and extensive are the gifts from a prospective groom's family. The scale of gift is roughly arrived at but everyone in the community seems to have an approximate notion of how much is involved in even setting up the conditions of friendship whereby negotiations can begin. Since there are no overriding principles whereby people placed in certain structural relationships marry because of their location within the structure, this initial gift helps guarantee that women circulate in their proper class. It was commonly acknowledged that it would require gifts in excess of 700 dirhams to place one of the most prominent men in the Beni Wariyaghar in a responsive mood. This man had received suitors

584 for his daughter before and had accepted their gifts but subse-
431 quent negotiations had broken down. Generally, a man will not offer such gifts unless he believes he had a good chance of succeeding. Once the father or guardian of the girl has expressed an interest, all subsequent exchanges are not regarded as gifts but as negotiated prices.

584 Once the conditions for commencing negotiations appear
[574] propitious, a group of male relatives from the boy's side visits
[431] the home of the girl's family. Again it is customary to bring a lamb, loaves of bread, sugar, and tea, although the amount depends on the wealth of the family. The request for the girl is made on this occasion. After the meal has been served, the guests and host go through a prescribed formula. "Do you know why we have come?" The host responds: "Yes. You have come as my guests." The spokesman replies: "No. We have come to ask for your daughter." They then commence the bargaining. There are two separate categories of items that are discussed. There is the
[583] sdaq, or dowry, that must be paid the father of the bride in order to provide her trousseau. This is always in cash. Second, there is bargaining in the amount of goods the groom's family are willing to spend on the ceremony. Both sides will argue over how many bulls, or sheep, or goats shall be provided for the ceremony, along with the quantity of barley and wheat, the loaves of bread, kilos of sugar and tea, and the liters of cooking oil.

584 The major expenditure, however, is the sdaq or the gift
583 from the groom's family to the bride's family to purchase her

584 trousseau. The sdaq does not seem to be regarded as a purchase
583 sum which transfers rights in ownership from one family to another. Although such a transfer may be regarded as an attribute of this exchange, this is not the indigenous explanation. By furnishing the bride with new clothings and new furniture, a husband symbolizes that he is accepting the material responsibilities of her well-being. The bride, in turn, acknowledges that she is relinquishing her material interests in her father's household. Westermarck (1914:72) says that in some places in
[114] Morocco, including tribes in the Rif, the father keeps a portion
[124] of the sdaq for his own purposes. My own field questioning resulted in no example of a parent diverting any portion of the sdaq to his own use. While this may occur on occasion, my informants seemed shocked at the notion and voiced strong disapproval.

Since the bride brings no clothes purchased in her premarried days into her new home, the minimal item required for a marriage is a new wardrobe, including numerous idfins (typical female dress), belts, handkerchiefs, shawls, and slippers. Also required are a wooden chest, and a brass or copper tray and tea pot. All this is placed in the wedding chest which accompanies the bride to the wedding ceremony. It is also customary for the girl to give gifts to all close members of her family, taken from the sdaq (dress and shoes for mother, shoes for sisters, shirts for brothers).

The amount of sdaq varies considerably according to the social position of the families involved. There is considerable

584 haggling over the price, with each side naturally hoping to
583 achieve the best terms. Negotiations can break off at this point but it is considered extremely bad form and every effort is made by representatives of both sides to arrive at an equitable sum. I knew of no sdaq which was less than 500 dirhams ($100) and the average seemed to fall between 500 and 1,000
584 dirhams with some payments going up to 3,000. Hart (1956:170)
583 puts the average at between $50 and $125. The divergence of
114 our figures no doubt stems from monetary changes over the past ten years. Hart's figures were based on the Spanish peseta, which was the form of currency up until 1958 in the Rif. My own figures are based on Moroccan dirhams established on a parity with French francs. With the incorporation of the
(458) Spanish zone into the more prosperous French zone, prices for all goods have drastically spiraled upward in the northern zone over the past ten years. Hart is in agreement with my notion that these sums represent a considerable expense to the Berbers.

584 During the negotiations a fqih is present to write down
212 the ultimate agreement over each item, whether it be ceremonial
583 expense or sdaq. He also acts as a mediator, being presumably the only disinterested party present. When the final sum is determined, and this may take many hours and last till dawn of the next day, the fqih draws up a marriage contract. Cash for the sdaq is supposed to be turned over then, but on occasion
584 only a part is exchanged. All the men shake hands and,
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584 depending on the hour, return to their respective homes or stay
583 overnight as guest of the bride's father.

584 Once the financial arrangement has been settled, the rep-
583 resentatives of both families go to the religious judge (qadi)
692 in Alhucemas or Targuist and present him with the list of obli-
gations the groom's family has accepted. The young couple are
also supposed to attend this meeting, and in the urban centers
it is obligatory. However, judges who serve tribal areas are
rather relaxed about such attendance and are satisfied if the
fathers are in agreement. It is a rule of thumb that judges
[671] who serve rural Berber areas allow customary procedures to pre-
vail over civil law if the matter does not infringe upon the
security of the state.

584 At this point the groom's family begins to collect the
583 necessary goods for the wedding celebration. This process may
369 take some time, and over a year may pass between the initial
184 agreement and the completion of the stipulated requirements
of the groom. This is, however, quite rare and seems more
584 associated with Berbers living in the city. Among the fellah
585 the marriage has been contracted for good reason and it is
thought best to consummate it as rapidly as possible. Often
the marriage ceremony takes place less than a month after the
meeting to determine the expenses.

585 When all the money and goods have been collected, both
583 parties meet with the qadi again, two or three days before the
692 wedding ceremony. The qadi checks off all the items to make sure

585 that the groom's side has complied with the original agreement.
[583] Once he has satisfied himself that all is in order, he signs
[692] the necessary marriage document. At this point the couple are
[184] legally married and many poor urban matches terminate here. In
[369] the Rif, however, the marriage is not socially sanctioned until the wedding ceremony is held.

585 By now, the groom's family has incurred several different
583 types of expense, although none of them is exactly 'bride-price'
431 or a payment to the bride's family to compensate for her loss. The first sort of payment is the gift, or zattat, given to the father to put him in a receptive mood. This places the recipient in obligation to the giver, although the Riffians seem to attach no binding commitment arising from this and a father can receive such gifts from an unlimited number of suitors. The second expense is the sdaq, which is in cash and devoted, at least in the Central Rif, exclusively for the purchase of objects to set up the new household. The final type of expense involves ceremonial costs for the wedding party.

585 - - The wedding celebration or thamagra is held in the late
[221] summer and early autumn after the harvesting of the cereals and while the weather is temperate. For several days prior to the
585 ceremony both the bride and groom, separately but with a group
574 of their friends, go from house to house within their dchar. Often the two parties go on a circuit of the same houses at the same time, although this is not always followed. When they do go to the same houses, the girl's party precedes the male group

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[533] by five or ten minutes. As they travel through the hills, each group sings praise songs of themselves and occasionally derogative songs about the other group. As they sing quite loudly, they can generally hear one another's songs even if they can not always see each other. The bride's group is the larger, numbering about twenty girls, all unmarried, while the male group consists rarely of more than ten and may include married male friends. The groom himself is addressed as Moulay or Sultan during this procession and the men with him are his iwziren or advisors. This is a borrowing of terms which are traditionally used to designate positions in the Moroccan government.

As they come to each house, the girls enter into the inside patio where they sing and dance, while the men enter a separate but connected guest room where they are offered tea and a meal. It is customary for the family head of each
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431 visited house to present the groom with a sum of money and a gift of clothing or new shoes. The amount given is related to the prominence and wealth of the household, to the degree of relatedness between the groom and the giver, and to previous reciprocal gifts bestowed by members of the groom's family on the host. These gifts, grama, are interpreted by Westermarck as ". . . really a loan which has to be repaid in the future under corresponding circumstances, or an indemnity for similar contributions in the past; hence the amounts given by the various donors are most carefully taken note of" (1914:125).

585 On the day before the bride goes from her home to the home of the groom's father, and after the procession collecting the grama has occurred, celebrations are held in the homes of both [574] the bride and the groom. Patri- and matrilineal kinsmen as well as friends are invited to each house. If the marriage is between related persons, the kinsmen go to the house of the person with whom they have the closest connection either in terms of nearness [582] of kinship, friendship, or both. Since marriage for the majority of the fellah occur in a close community and often with relatives, the parties are often held in adjoining houses or at least in quite nearby places. In such cases the guests often move from one party to another. The ceremony which takes place at the bride's house is also financed by the groom's family, who send over the necessary animals, bread, oil, and so forth. At the bride's house her girlhood friends dance and sing in the patio [302] for the entertainment of the ensemble. The bride's hands are [431] painted with henna during a ceremony in which each of her girl friends and older female relatives gives her a small gift (grama).

585 At the groom's house a similar ceremony takes place. If 533 the father is wealthy, or even if poor but with sufficient social 463 credit, he will hire professional musicians who play, sing and [464] dance at the home of the groom on this night and the following [465] one. These musicians, who receive $20 to $40 for the celebration, also take up contributions from the assembled guests. There is [619] a tribal fraction in the Beni Turin who, for obscure reasons, have taken up this occupation as their professional speciality.

585 The father of the groom provides meals and tea for all
574 the guests at his home as well as at the house of the bride.
262 The meal for the guests in even the humblest of homes consists of a course of cous-cous and a meat tajin. In most ceremonies there is also a poultry course. Enormous quantities of bread and tea are also served. The most accepted casual factor for
[178] reducing the days of the wedding ceremony from seven as they were before Abdel Krim to two or three days as they are today was that the expenses of providing hospitality over such an extended period of time was ruinous to all but the most prosperous families.

585 Guests are likewise expected to incur various expenses.
574 At this moment we need only note the recurrent support of a
571 public ceremony which is expected throughout Berber society. All mature guests are expected to provide a quantity of barley, loaves of freshly baked bread, fresh fruit and vegetables, or a monetary equivalent. This tends to discourage, among the poor fellah, the presence of nonrelatives, because it represents an outlay which is not part of their residual social obligations. In addition, such attendance by a nonrelative imposes future obligations which, in only rare circumstances, they are willing to accept. By attending the wedding and taking part in the joining in matrimony of the couple, one gratuitously assumes the duty of attending the naming ceremonies for the infants of this union. Such acceptance of [illegible]esponsibility is not normally accepted unless there is social [illegible]dvantage thereby.

585 The primary social obligation for the guests occurs on the night of the wedding ceremony. On this evening the bride [593] is brought by her elder brother or a close male relative (but [602] not her father or uncles) to the home of the groom. Transpor- [492] tation is usually by mule with the bride leading the procession, [754] atop a mule and wrapped from head to toe in cloth to avoid the [494] evil eye. In the more accessible areas and among the wealthier [492] families, the bride is brought by truck or taxi to within a few [178] hundred yards of the groom's home where she mounts a mule and follows the rest of the customary procedure. Her parents are left behind at their home and do not see her for another seven days. The bride, dangling precariously from her mount and followed by her entourage, is met some fifty yards in front of the groom's house by his party. This moment signals a renewal of festivities by songs and dances by both a group of girls who accompany the bride and a group of girls associated with the [533] groom's family. Entered into this melee are also the professional musicians, making the entrance into the groom's home quite spectacular. The bride when she arrives at the house is handed a bag of barley which she ceremonially tosses to the right, left, and directly behind her, symbolically representing the hope of fertility from her concourse with her new husband. She then enters the house and remains isolated with the women until the next day.

585 The social obligations of the guests occur at this time, 594 when they are expected to give gifts of cash to whoever sponsored 591 431

b Joseph E-5 (1965-1966) 1975 MX3 Rif MX3

585 574 571 431 the groom's wedding and to the groom himself. This is the high point of the celebration and a public demonstration of the web of social debts that have been accumulated over the past or projected into the future.

The gift giving takes place during a ceremony which is supposed to emulate a royal court paying tribute to the king. The groom, addressed as Moulay, or Sultan, enters into a circle of guests who are sitting outside the house on mats or under arbours. He is accompanied by the same set of men who had gone around with him on the previous week collecting grana. This is a group of six or seven close male friends and relatives called his iwziren, from the Arabic wazir (viziers), or ministers. It is rather odd that the terminological forms of central government (sultan and viziers) should exist in the traditional wedding ceremony in an area where the central government exercised little or no authority. That it existed prior to the introduction of central authority is, however, quite certain since both Coon (1931:134-135) and Renisio (1932:146-150) report it.

[154] The groom, wearing a new jeballa, the hood of which covers his face to ward off evil eyes, enters the circle accompanied by his iwziren. As this procession enters into the circle of male

[538] [539] guests they sing in Arabic,

sabhain er-razik
sabhain el-khalaik
sabhain er-ruwak
El ardh el-khalaik

Praise be to the Provider
Praise be to the Creator
Praise be to the Permanent
The Creation has begun.

585 as they walk inside the circle three times. Traditionally,
574 rifles were fired by the iwziren but with the confiscation
571 of all firearms, firecrackers are today used as substitutes.
431

The groom then sits down on a chair in front of a low table which has previously been placed in the center of the circle. Squatting beside him on the ground are his iwziren, his father, and usually his younger brother. Behind him stand four girls who throughout the remaining ceremony fan him with their scarfs. At this point the gift giving commences. The
[522] gifts, always in money, are collected by a traditional spokesmen, often a comic figure, who makes jokes and dances about as he announces aloud who has made the contribution and how much it is. With each announcement, the women who are inside the house but huddled around the doors peering out at the ceremony, commence to ululate. The comic figure goes about the crowd collecting gifts which he hands over to the groom's father, who places them in a brass tray in front of Moulay. The largest gifts, usually given at the beginning of the ceremony, are from relatives of the groom's father, such as brothers and uncles, as well as from relatives of the bride and close friends of the groom's father. These gifts are rarely under 100 dirhams but as the evening progresses smaller gifts of from 5 to 20 dirhams are given by age mates of the groom, by guests who wish to express their thanks for the evening's entertainment, and by local notables who feel it incumbent to give a small gift at each wedding they attend. The greater part of each gift goes to the father of the

585 groom to help defray the expenses of the wedding, but a part can
574 also be designated for the groom's personal use. Each gift must
571 also specify a small amount for the person who makes the public
431 announcement. A typical large gift would be announced as two hundred dirhams for the master of the wedding (the father), five dirhams for Moulay el-Sultan (the groom), and one dirham for the spokesman.

Although the smaller gifts are given gratuitously out of good will, the larger ones (fifty dirhams and upwards) are part of an extensive system of social obligations on the part of blood relatives, affines, and friends who are either fulfilling past obligations or setting up future ones. Recipients of gifts given by the father of the groom in the past are now expected to respond in kind. If the marriage is between members of the same lineage or between families who have contracted prior matrimonial links, a set of obligations will already exist. If it is the first marriage between two families, the bride's family is supposed to initiate good relations between the two families by donating to help defray the wedding expenses.

585 Coon has noted in passing (1931:141) that this gift giving
574 can become a competitive game in which the guests give increas-
571 ingly larger amounts of money during the ceremony in order to
431 shame rivals. I have never encountered such a situation in which
556 the ante was raised during the ceremony itself, but a somewhat
[114] similar incident occurred in which a man donated more than the community felt to be his social obligation. At a wedding in one

585 of the fractions of the Beni Wariyaghar, four large gifts were
574 given. One of these gifts was 350 dirhams ($70) from a friend
591 of the groom's father, another of 450 dirhams from a brother of
431 the groom's father. The final two gifts were from two men who
556 had married daughters of the groom's father. One of these sons-in-law had been married into the family of the groom's father for ten years and assumed a superior attitude towards the other son-in-law, who had only two years previously married into this family. The latter, a young man who was poor in his own right but related to several well-off families, went to his relatives borrowing from each in turn. At the wedding ceremony he was able to give 400 dirhams to the father, or one hundred dirhams more than the other brother-in-law. At the time of the ceremony (578) the shamed brother-in-law bitterly accused the younger man's entire family of deliberately shaming him. The family denied that they had been in collusion with the boy, but also they took his side in the dispute and the two families ceased speaking to one another. As a participant on the one side explained to me, "I have a little bit of the evil eye for that outfit and they probably have the same for us."

585 After all the donations have been collected, the groom's
574 father and his paternal uncles take the tray filled with money
571 into the house and counts the proceeds. The amount received by
431 the groom's father may equal the outlay that he had to make to finance the wedding, and if the sequence of events ended here the man's debts might be balanced out by his newly acquired assets.

585 Gift exchanges of this sort, however, are part of an ongoing
571 system, rooted in past transactions and perpetuating future
431 obligations. If, for example, a man paid $300 for a wedding
182 and received back $300 in gifts, the account would by no means be balanced. Unless the man were wealthy, the original $300 was accumulated through a network of previous obligations and the subsequent $300 has set up a whole new series of obligations. [426] There are few Riffians who are owed no debts and owe no debts to others. The system is rarely in even balance where one's debts are equal to one's credits. It is a system of exchange guided entirely by its own rules and completely divorced from commercial exchange. Its ability to work as a system is guaranteed by the pride and honor of the participants.

585 The final ceremonial act involves a feast held on the
574 seventh day following the last day of the wedding. On this day the immediate relatives (father and mother) of the bride see her for the first time since she left their home. This is a much smaller ceremony, involving only the close relatives of [431] the two families involved. On this occasion, in addition to the food provided by the host, small gifts are given the bride by her own family. This celebration is socially important because the groom's family wishes to impress upon the visitors
585 how well their daughter has married. This sentiment seems to
574 be particularly felt among the women associated with the groom's
152 family. They are placed in a strained position since the bride's
[292] party are dressed in their finest guest costume, while the women
[291] of the groom's family wear their everyday working clothes.

585 of the groom's family wear their everyday working clothes. A
574 feeling of intense competition seems to surround this ceremony
152 with the women of the bride's family appearing lofty and superior vis-à-vis the groom's family. Perhaps it is embodied in the compensatory feeling that one family has permanently lost a member to another family.

585 The seven days prior to this celebration are regarded as a 'honeymoon' during which the bride is still special. With the passing of this ceremony she is no longer tislith (bride) but timrath (wife) and must assume the ordinary business of household
585 activities. Westermarck (1914:309) mentions a further ceremony
431 on the fortieth day after the wedding, in which a goat is slaughtered by the groom and the meat taken to the wife's father's house. There countergifts, in the form of a cow or some goats, are given by the girl's father. This ceremony may
[114] have lapsed by the time I worked in the Rif. At least I have
[198] no data in my notes regarding rituals of marriage following the seventh day ceremony.

6: Joseph E-5 (1965-1966) 1975 MX3 Rif MX3

Chapter 4

VARIETIES OF SOCIAL EXPENSE: RELIGION AND MAGIC

In the previous chapter I attempted to demonstrate that a certain proportion of the expenses of the Berber in the Rif, either in the form of consumption or investment, is motivated by obligations arising out of familial responsibilities. In this chapter I shall take up the role that magic and religion play in the distribution of wealth. I have attempted to show how incentives arising mainly from the way the Riffian interprets the supernatural world have an effect on the consumption, dispersal, and/or exchange of wealth. My aim is to demonstrate the feedback from ritual to production in the hope of eliciting one of the main distinctions between industrial and nonindustrial economies. To put the argument succinctly, in the former one finds little relationship between the use of wealth and religious or magical ceremony while in the latter there is a high degree of interaction. While the amount of wealth used for such activities in an industrial society is proportionaly small in comparison to the total wealth, in a nonindustrial society it may be one of the most frequent and common expenses.

In common with most world religions, Islam serves a heterogeneous religious community. As a consequence of this there exists a bifurcation of its form and content. On the one hand it serves a more or less sophisticated segment who find spiritual

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guidance from the Book and the various interpretations of the Book made by a body of literate scholars. But it also serves as a vehicle for the spiritual expression of the illiterate and the superstitious. The needs of the one community, though not necessarily incompatible with the other, are of a different nature. To meet the needs of the rural tribesmen, a cult of saints has long existed in Morocco. The earliest reference to this phenomenon in the Rif can be found in the work of 'Abd el-Haqq el-Badisi's Lives of the Saints of the Rif, dated 1311 and translated from Arabic to French by G. S. Colin (1926). The more formal aspects of Islam whereby a morality is derived from dialectic interpretation of Koranic scripture did not have the power of explanation among the tribesmen as mysticism. As Colin points out in his introduction to el-Badisi's work:

> Il s'agit donc, en somme, d'un effort de vulgarisation de la science religieuse et, plus spécialement, du mysticisme, dans le but de rendre ce dernier plus populaire et plus pittoresque, et de permettre par là aux ames simples d'y prendre intérêt et de s'y attacher. (Ibid.:8)

A man became a saint because of various miracles performed during his lifetime which, according to the beliefs of the tribesmen, signify that the man had a closer connection with the spiritual world. In most areas of Morocco the saint was also a sharif or descendent of the Prophet. This does not seem to be a vital criterion for sainthood in the Rif. El-Bakiri lists only one of the saints in his hagiography as being a sharif (1926:11).

The tribesmen came to the saint during his lifetime for advice in spiritual and secular affairs. According to his success

(real or putative) in such matters, his reputation expanded from a localized base to a regional and even a national one. Upon the death of a holy man a shrine would be erected to serve as a permanent place which the tribesmen could visit. To such places the Berbers come to petition for divine intermediacy. They seek remedy for ill health, barrenness, and so forth, either on their own behalf or for a friend or relative. Although pilgrimages can be made at any time, there are also various saints in the Rif that attract several thousand people on specific celebration days. These communal affairs are annual events and must be added to the schedule of pilgrimages for individualistic causes. The part of the pilgrimage which shall concern us is the economic aspects.

The expense of such a pilgrimage depends on several factors. There is always a sacrificial element but the type of animal to be killed is not specified. It is generally believed that the more costly the sacrifice the greater the baraka that the saint will pass on. Thus although chickens are often used, a lamb or goat is preferred to increase the efficacy. The sacrificial animal itself is divided three ways, with the pilgrimage party receiving a third which is consumed on the site. Another third goes to the moqaddem who is in charge of maintaining the shrine, and the final third goes to the poor who live in the vicinity of the tomb.

As an example of the costs involved in even a short pilgrimage to a local shrine, we might examine the pilgrimage of a group of eight women and four men who were traveling to the

788 cemetery of Sidi Malik in the community of Had Ruadi in the tribe
778 of Iboyyia in the summer of 1966. They had come from the frac-
435 tion of Arba Taurirt in the Beni Wariyaghar. At least one of the
[755] pilgrims was ill, presumably suffering from the effects of the
[754] evil eye or a djnoun, one of the most prevalent causes for visit-
[494] ing a holy place. The group had left Arba on the seven o'clock
bus for Alhucemas where they had taken another bus to Had Ruadi,
[782] where they spent the night. Four chickens were brought and killed
at the tomb. The next day they returned to Arba by way of
Alhucemas. The cost of the journey itself can be calculated
fairly closely. Each person had to pay 5 dirhams to go from
Arba to Alhucemas and an additional 3 dirhams to go from Alhucemas
to Had. There was an expense of 8 dirhams to make the trip and
another 8 to return, or 16 dirhams ($3.20) for each person. The
chickens can roughly be priced at 10 dirhams apiece, or having a
cash value of $8.00. The total expense for the group was at
least $45, a not inconsiderable outlay of cash and goods, espe-
cially if we recall Waterson's per capita output of the fellah
family is $60. If this were a mere isolated instance such expense
would be negligible in terms of the entire society. The pilgrim-
age is, however, part of the texture of Rif society and such
instances form the pattern rather than the exception.

792 Some of the more ambitious holy men and their followers
794 have set up rather unique firms, the religious brotherhood, a
575 form of voluntary association of such prominence in north Africa.
(A detailed account of one such order is given by Evans-Pritchard,

792 1949.) Not all holy men have formed brotherhoods although all
794 founders of brotherhoods are regarded as holy men, the font of
575 the association being the baraka possessed by its initiator.
[779] These brotherhoods generally emanated from some charismatic
[554] leader whose own brand of revelation attracted local adherents.

792 Once the spiritual and magical qualities of the saint
794 have been proven, his brotherhood grows. This, of course, tends
795 to be circular since growing membership validifies the founder's
575 abilities. New lodges or zawiya are founded, to be administered by the holy man's more capable and loyal disciples. As the cult grows the leader, as a result of his personal mediations with Allah, pronounces a new set of spiritual techniques and strictures in addition to the usual ones followed by all adherents to Islam. A new set of practices to attain communion with God
[779] in the form of special uses of the rosaries, scarification, physical contortions and manner of praying may be introduced along with taboos on smoking, dancing or drinking coffee.

792 These religious associations are for the most part volun-
794 tary although there tends to be a familial association whereby a
575 son belongs to the same lodge his father belonged to. Although they tend to be highly political there has been, to the best of my knowledge, no correlation between a particular brotherhood and a particular tribe. Perhaps the diversity of membership in competing brotherhoods reflects the fragmentation of loyalty within the tribes and fractions. At the turn of the century the Darkawiya cult was dominant in the Rif. A former member of this

792 brotherhood, Shaikh Ahmad al-'Alawi (1869-1934) broke off from
794 the organization to form his own association which is now the
575 largest in the Rif. According to informant estimate, this brotherhood holds about 50% of those Berbers in the Rif who belong to brotherhoods. Its annual meeting which I attended in 1965 consisted of several thousand brothers from all parts of the Rif and from neighboring Algeria where the mother lodge is located.

792 The importance of these fraternal orders declined to a
794 certain extent during the struggle for Moroccan independence
575 because of their anti-nationalistic behavior. When they are
178 criticized in the Rif it is not on theological grounds but
[662] political. The brotherhoods have been accused of accepting bribes in order to influence their membership on how to vote in local elections and to act as spies for the government. Their cogency has also been reduced by the increase in secular as opposed to Koranic education. Nonetheless, they have a powerful residual following, as attested by the vehemency with which they are attacked.

792 The fraternity supports itself on the annual contributions
794 in kind extracted as membership fees from its adherents as well
575 as the more or less regular visits to the key shrines and lodges
[124] where, again, donations are expected. The size of this contribution is most difficult to estimate, and my inquiries of lodge officials met with only our mutual exasperation. The amount seems to vary with the avarice of the local lodge, where 10% of

792 794 575 [124] annual income may be claimed. Informants agreed that a figure of 5% of annual income might not be an inaccurate sum for a member to donate to his zariwya.

788 484 [179] Aside from these rather special claims on one's sum of wealth are the regular demands made by one's being a member of the Islamic community. Perhaps the most difficult of these obligations for the Riffian is the hadj or pilgrimage to Hijaz, Mecca, the birthplace of Mohammed, and to Medina where he died. [805] The hadj itself takes place between the seventh and the thirteenth of the twelfth month of the Muslim calendar, the Dhu 'l-Hijja. While in former days men traveled in caravans or [178] [509] by boat, the most popular form of locomotion today is Air Maroc which offers special rates during the period of the pilgrimage. Although the number of Riffians making the trip is, in any one year, not proportionately large, it is a rather significant group. [435] The investment is large, ranging from 3,000 to 6,000 dirhams, depending on the means of transportation and the time spent in getting there and back. If one has a family, which is generally [671] the case, one must (by law) leave behind enough money to provide for their expenses while the pilgrim is away. Only the older, [554] wealthier (and as a consequence most respected) Berbers can become al-Hadj, the honorific title bestowed on those who have 788 484 626 completed the journey to Mecca. The trip is not, however, completely voluntary. If a man is prominent and in the minds of the populace of the community well-off, there is a good deal of pressure placed on him, in the form of ridicule, gossip and general public disapproval, if he begs off the pilgrimage.

000 general public disapproval, if he begs off the pilgrimage. The
788 authority that al-Hadj possesses is quite real and the man who
484 feels his resources might be better deployed for profit-making
554 enterprises will not carry this authority within the community. If a man wishes to maintain a position of prominence in the Rif and is fifty years or older, it is practically mandatory for him to travel to Mecca.

796 While the hadj does not affect all the Rif economically the ceremony of the Great Feast or Aid al-Kebir which is held all over the Muslim world on the tenth day of Dhu 'l-Hijja has
[782] a universal application. On this date every family head must sacrifice a ram to commemorate God's beneficence in allowing Abraham to sacrifice a lamb in the stead of his son Ishmael.

796 The month preceding this ceremony is one of intense
591 anxiety for the poor, for they must acquire either the animal
602 or the money by which to get one. Many of the Riffians have a
435 stock of animals from which they can select the sacrificial ram.
[152] Those who do not must rely on their wealthier sponsors, either
[231] relatives or business associates. The price of rams spirals upwards as the day of Aid al-Kebir approaches, reaching its climax the day before the celebration. Men who normally earn a subsistence wage in Alhucemas or Targuist begin to spend more time among their relatives in the countryside as they attempt to reinforce their communal support within the traditional cul-
796 tural setting. In many ways the celebration is comparable to
435 Christmas in Christian countries, except that the expenses

796 435 involved in celebrating Christmas can be adjusted to household income, whereas the expenses of Aid al-Kebir have a fixed character below which one is culturally not allowed to go.

796 785 Although the celebration of Aid al-Kebir is regarded by the Berbers as the most expensive, there are several other events in the cycle of religious festivals which have economic repercussions. The most important of these is Ramadan, the fasting month for Muslims. During the entirety of this month, the ninth in the Muslim lunar calendar, the Riffians fast from sunrise to sunset. [461] The lack of food during the day decreases the amount of energy one can expend on production. The period is a particularly difficult one if it falls during the summer months with their long and hot days (water is also prohibited) or during critical production months such as the ploughing period or harvest time. The [264] usual practice among the fellah is to rise at three o'clock in the morning and eat a final meal before day breaks. They then retire and attempt to sleep as long into the day as possible. [461] Wage labor in the city suffers especially, since their work [369] pattern is established along more rigid lines. The fasting 796 period has particularly devastating effects on the entrepreneurs 785 at the weekly markets. Because travel is so difficult during 472 Ramadan, the sugs are rather skimpily attended. Men who prepare 443 and vend food at the marketplace simply go out of business for [265] the duration of the period. The end of Ramadan is marked by the 796 Little Festival or Aid as-Saghir. Aid as-Saghir is naturally a 785 time of rejoicing since the period of fasting has come to an end.

796 Since traveling has been so severely restricted by limitations
785 of energy, the end of Ramadan finds friends and relatives paying
[574] numerous visits to one another. If the family can afford it, it
[432] is customary to buy new clothes at this time. The men of the
[431] community all retire in the morning to the village mosque where
[794] they are expected to give small gifts of cash or in kind. While it is not obligatory, the men of the mosque often take up subscription in order to purchase and distribute amongst themselves a bull.

796 The remainder of the cycle of festivals are of secondary importance in terms of economic activity. There are small celebrations for the beginning of the Muslim year, 'Ashura, and on the 27th day of the seventh month (Rajab) commemorating the ascension of Mohammed to the ultimate heaven. On the 12th day of the third month, the anniversary of the birth of the Prophet is celebrated. Coon (1931:152) states that on this day the men
[782] of each community purchase a bull which they sacrifice and dis-
[814] tribute among themselves. Unfortunately, I neglected to corroborate this point while in the field.

346 Before turning from religious activities to magical prac-
794 tices, I wish to discuss the maintenance of the local community mosque. Within each tribal section or cluster of villages there is a mosque which the men of the community attend on Fridays and on important religious occasions. The rural mosque looks more or less like an ordinary Riffian home of residence built of mud bricks with an open courtyard. The mosques have no minarets.

346 794 The religious function of the mosque is by no means its most important. It also serves as the location for the Koranic school which as recently as ten years ago was the only sort of education provided for the children of the fellah. In areas where population density is high, the government has set up secular schools [658] [178] which all but replace the Koranic education. The mosque is also used as the place for public assembly of the community.

The mosque is built and kept in repair by the men of the community either through their own labor or through subscription to hire a professional master builder. The property belongs to 346 794 the mosque, generally from specific inheritance provisions. Many 423 larger property owners wishing to pave their way to paradise by [425] some act on earth will donate property to religious organizations. [782] Crops are grown on this bequested territory which serve to meet [241] some of the expenses of the religious man in charge of the mosque.

793 The mosque is presided over by a fqih, a learned man who [212] has had Koranic education and knows how to read and write Arabic. [794] He delivers the weekly sermon and provides lessons to the youth in Koranic education. It is the obligation of every married man 793 794 within the area served by the mosque to make an annual donation 465 to the mosque to provide for the fqih. The amount, while generally the same for all family heads, is not permanently fixed and can be adjusted according to how good or bad the crop yield was from the preceding year. In the year I was present the community assembly assessed a total of 25 kilos of barley to each man. The fqih also receives weekly donations of eggs from his

793 students, as well as the revenue that accrues from the property
794 owned by the mosque. He also receives cash or kind for his
465 services as the magical advisor for the community, a service which I shall discuss below.

754 In a land in which there is so much witchcraft, it is
789 not surprising to find a great deal of ritual being used to evoke charms and spells. As Westermarck demonstrated in innumerable works, magic permeates almost all social behavior in
791 Morocco. There are two types of magical specialists in Rif
754 society. One is the fqih who has magical powers because of his
[793] knowledge of the Koran and the belief that magical powers are
[799] embodied in the Book. The other specialists are the female
754 witches whose magic is supposed to derive from their lore passed
791 on from mother to daughter. Not all women are regarded as witches
562 although the female quality is believed to have magical potency.
[888] This potency is thought to increase with age and old women are universally treated with respect, partially out of fear of their magical powers. Men of an elderly age are not so regarded.

754 The two classes of sorcerer use different magical tech-
791 niques. The fqih disperses charms and spells by writing passages
789 from the Koran on a piece of paper which thus has magical qual-
793 ities. The witches have a more varied inventory consisting of herbs and roots (poisonous or otherwise), stones, pieces of wood
[443] from holy trees, small dead animals and the like. The services of both are called upon often and it is not uncommon to have witches set up booths in the open weekly market to hawk their

754 791 789 793 443 wares in public, while the fqihs are busily selling their charms in the seclusion of the tea and hashish shops that ring the same market.

To the best of my knowledge Justinard was the first to describe the phenomenon in the Rif:

> Les Rifains croient beaucoup aux amulettes et aux sortilèges, aux pratiques occultes qui servent à nuire à un ennemi, à le faire mourir, à forcer l'amour, a obtenir une guérison. C'est surtout l'affaire des Telbas [fqih] et des vieilles femmes (1926:57).

791 754 789 435 The costs of the services of such magical specialists vary with the seriousness of the difficulty. Women generally pay in kind since they have such meager resources at their disposal. Men usually pay cash. A love potion may cost no more than a liter of olive oil or a dime. Prolonged medical healing may [755] require several thousand dirhams and accommodation for the sorcerer in food and lodging over a lengthy period of time. One [755] of my informants kept a pair of magicians in his house for six months in an attempt to restore his mother's eyesight. Another informant, a woman who herself was regarded as having supernatural power, estimated that she had spent the equivalent of fifty dollars over a decade to ward off various evil eyes. The magi- [554] cians of the Rif are, however, not known for their potency and for special problems, magicians or holy men are imported from the Ghomara or the Sus.

[755] As can be seen from the above, much magic is devoted to 000 curing illness. Most sickness is attributed to evil spirits,

753 Most sickness is attributed to evil spirits,
776 the djnoun. These creatures are held responsible for malaria,
[164] epileptic and paralytic seizures, rheumatic and neuralgic pains, cholera, whooping cough, smallpox, and so forth. The djnoun themselves are usually invisible but can take the shape of an animal or human. When a person falls ill it is believed that either a djnoun has possessed him or he has been given the evil eye.

755 There are various methods of purging oneself of the djnoun,
782 generally involving animal sacrifice either at a saint's tomb or mosque. Although the Moroccan government has set up medical
657 facilities in the rural areas, the local doctors and nurses
743 admit that the vast majority of illness is treated in the tradi-
755 tional way. This is especially true of the women who are cul-
[562] turally prohibited from going before a stranger for a medical examination.

751 Investment is not only made to remedy the effects of the
782 djnoun after the fact, but also as a preventive of such effects. To prevent the evil effects of the djnoun an animal is sacrificed before the building of a new house (Westermarck 1920:34), when the digging of a well commences, and again when water is reached (Ibid.:71).

754 Another form of magic over which the Riffian is much disposed to worry is the evil eye. Most people in this society believe that a glance or stare from certain persons can produce an evil spell. Everyone has the potential to give the evil eye

754 and one can get it not only from people who dislike you but from
[152] people who love you. The eye is thought to most often result from jealousy, and one of the social mechanisms for constraining hubris is that pride over secular success will bring disaster upon the individual.

754 The fear of the evil eye runs counter to another major
756 principle in the Rif, the conspicuous display of prosperity as
752 a mechanism to increase prestige. The balance between avoiding jealousy and being successful is rather difficult to maintain. In any economic action the aspect of success has a countervailing feature of disaster. Although the evil eye resembles the djnoun
[753] in that it conveys the same sort of misfortune in the form of
[796] death and disease, there is one critical difference. The djnoun is regarded as an independent agent operating of its own volition, while the evil eye operates through a specific human agent.
[578] The evil eye is the more dangerous of the two because it increases friction within the community between families or within the same family. The incentive to earn profit is curbed by the fear of attracting misfortune through the evil eye. One man who had set up a small store to sell tea, oil, sugar, and the like, dressed his children in increasingly scruffy clothing in order that his economic success would not attract envy.

751 Aside from the avoidance patterns caused by the evil eye, amulets are considered particularly efficacious as a protective
[793] device. The amulets are generally prepared by the fqih, who
[435] inscribes them with sayings from the Koran. Prices for these

751 vary greatly, from less than a dirham to several hundred dirhams.
435 Although it is impossible to estimate how much money goes for investments of this sort, the qualitative importance of investments to prevent misfortune from the evil eye is great.

One other rite ought to be mentioned of imitative magic
796 directly related to production. Since crops are dry farmed,
241 the success of any one year depends on the amount of rain
789 received in that year. Unfortunately, the Rif is not blessed
821 with a stable rainfall. When there is drought or even the fear of impending drought, each community in the Central Rif has a Bride-of-the-Rain ceremony (<u>thasrith anzar</u>). For such a ceremony a ladle normally used to put bread into the household ovens is dressed in the costume of a bride. The young female virgins
[533] carry this 'bride' from house to house within their community,
[539] singing the refrain,

a-reeth-nia-la
arabe ya-sidi
atawah- n-shala

Give us Oh God
Give us water quickly
Make water quickly.

They stop at each household to receive coins and prepared food.
[782] At the same time, all the men go to the communal mosque or a nearby saint's tomb where they sacrifice a bull purchased with contributions for everyone in the community. After the ceremony the meat is distributed among the participants. Although this example is related to both consumption and production, it would

6: Joseph E-5 (1965-1966) 1975 MX3 Rif MX3

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seem that no technical analysis of it based on markets, price mechanisms or entrepreneur skill will offer satisfactory results.

The strands of the argument in this chapter may now be

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brought together. One of the forces that is influential in determining how wealth shall be used is located in the world of the supernatural. Motivated by mysticism, by religious duty and by fear, the Berber of the Rif seeks succor in a wide variety of activities. All such activities require outlays of wealth which are, on the whole, economically nonproductive (in that one does not have a chance of economic reward from one's investment) but are socially satisfying and beneficial. Such moral and magical imperatives create an incentive towards investment, which is relatively unimportant in industrial society.

6: Joseph E-5 (1965-1966) 1975 MX3 Rif MX3

Chapter 5

VARIETIES OF SOCIAL EXPENSE: STATUS AND PRESTIGE

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The use of wealth in order to maintain or increase prestige is a feature which may have universal applicability to economic action. However, the outward manifestation of such a use of wealth varies from society to society. In industrial society there is a motivation for using wealth based on prestige, but because of the heterogeneous character of its composition, its different ethnic strains, different religions, different social classes, each sub-social unit has its own code and for the society at large there are no well-fixed rules. In the small-scale non-industrial society with its greater homogeneity, the code tends to be fixed and universal for the society. Thus one has the rather formal Kula ring with its minimization of options, the ritualized display and consumption of goods by Northwest Coast Indians, or the measuring of all social ties by cattle among the Nuer.

The Berbers of the Rif display a pattern which is between the flexible standards of prestige evaluation encountered in industrial society and the rigid standards of many traditional societies. The absence of rigidity does not imply that there is not a code of behavior involved in status but merely that the code is flexible.

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556 Within each Riffian community there are individuals and families of differential social status. This differentiation is only partially based on wealth. Such factors as religious piety, descent, reputation and personal integrity also play a role. Prior to the pacification of the Rif skill in warfare and bravery were also markers. For the moment I shall discuss differentiation based on wealth.

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423 The most important traditional measure of wealth was, and is today, property ownership. The more land one has, the larger a crop one shall harvest and the greater reserves one can put aside for winter fodder. A consequence is the larger number of animals one can maintain and hence the more elaborate one's ritual activities and the greater assistance one can give relatives, neighbors, and friends.

423
428 While large landholdings have a positive value in the Rif, such a goal is rather difficult to achieve because of the inheritance laws. Inheritance is based on the Maliki practice which divides the land amongst the heirs. Each son is allocated a full share and each daughter a half share. The widow (or widows) each receive an eighth of the property. In the absence of sons, the estate is divided so that the widow receives her eighth, while the remainder of the property is divided into three shares with the daughter(s) receiving two shares and the father's brother one share. If there are no children, the estate is divided among the brothers.

423 Property going to females, either to widows or daughters,
428 tends not to be disruptive since their control over their inher-
562 itance is minimized by law and social custom. Because of the
[587] practice of levirate, traditionally the widow's property was merely transferred from the effective management of one brother to that of another. Whether or not the widow marries a brother of her deceased husband, she can in no case sell her property without the permission of her husband's family.

562 The case of daughter inheritance is somewhat more dis-
428 ruptive. While widows generally remain within their deceased
[768] husband's family for the protection this affords, daughters marry out. Thus the daughter as another man's wife has a male champion to press claims for use or sale of the inheritance. To the question of should a man come to farm the land of his wife or demand a portion of its production, my informants state that technically he could do so but that no man would want to do this and that to their knowledge no man has ever done so.

428 The prevailing mechanism for avoiding disputes over the
431 inheritance of a daughter is a gift exchange between a man and
578 his sister's husband. If, for example, A's sister has married B,
182 B holds certain theoretical rights over his wife's land. A, on
607 the other hand, generally cultivates the land. B does not exer-
562 cise his claim, and indeed the community would disapprove if he did so. However, it is also considered appropriate for A when he visits his sister, to give B's household certain goods, processed barley, fruit, or whatever, which compensate for B's

562
428 noninterference in the use of the land inherited by A's sister
431 and B's wife. Another mechanism which achieves reciprocal
578 equality over inheritance is in sister exchange whereby land
182
607 claims are mutually balanced off.

428 Despite the weak claim that daughters exercise over their
423 inheritance, there are certain legal restrictions over their
607 property. A brother cannot sell his sister's land nor construct
562 on it unless he has obtained the prior permission of his sister's husband. Likewise, a husband cannot sell his wife's inherited property unless he has consulted with the woman's brothers, who have first option to purchase the land.

423 The male Riffian has a more solid claim over his inheri-
428 tance and although some families continue to work the land of their father jointly under the administration of the oldest brother, there tends to be a fragmentation of land with each successive generation. This process tends to level out differ-
423 entiations based on property holdings. On the other hand there
183 is no special cultural value placed on "shared poverty." The
556 aggrandizement of property holding is not a goal towards which
425 the community voices disapproval. To buy land increases a man's wealth as well as his prestige, but he is regarded as advancing his children rather than engaging in entrepreneurship or capital development. He is also regarded as maintaining community solidarity, which is quite the opposite of what the entrepreneur does. To alienate land is regarded as a great source of shame in the Rif. The property which one's father passed on should be

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given to one's sons. However, in times of extended drought and famine as in the mid 'forties and again in the late 'fifties, selling of land and migration to the urban centers have taken place on a fairly wide scale. In such a situation the property owner can sell to a stranger but he must give relatives first option and, if they are unwilling to exercise their right, he should give the option to someone inside the community. To buy land under such conditions is considered not only honorable but a community service in that it maintains the integrity of the community by preventing outsiders from becoming members. However, neither the buyer nor the community regards such a purchase as speculation for economic profit. Rather, they see it as community service and a socially approved method of advancing one's children. The acquisition of land under such circumstances is not a part of the motivation system based on profit but part of the same complex which includes social duty and community solidarity.

Land is, of course, one of the factors of production. But whether the Riffian regards this aspect as being the primary attribute of land can be questioned. A man of my acquaintance whose grandfather and father had made sizable land purchases held at the time more land than he could profitably cultivate and manage. Yet he was quite ashamed that he had not been able to buy more land so as to increase the legacy for his own children. To him the economic value of the land was secondary to its prestige function. Nash's remark about property among the Maya

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423 Nash's remark about property among the Maya
171 Indians of Guatemala has a certain degree of applicability in the Rif. ". . . Since land is what parents leave children to start their adult lives, the idea of heirloom or patrimony is closer to the definition of land than is commodity or factor of production" (1966:39).

556 Those Riffians who have enhanced their prestige by
576 acquiring greater wealth have certain incumbent social res-
574 ponsibilities which are not placed on the less fortunate. It is expected of all Riffians to offer a meal to anyone who comes asking. This form of hospitality is by tacit agreement, however, generally beholden on only the more prosperous. The majority of such travelers are religious men or Koranic students who travel about from community to community consulting with their own kind or making pilgrimages to local holy shrines. Since they are apparently universally poor, they depend for their livelihood on the hospitality of members of the local community. It is considered extremely bad manners not to provide for them in the way of food and lodging should they request such. (Actually, the proper etiquette is for the host to offer.) As an isolated incident such hospitality would appear to be only a slight inconvenience. However, the more prominent a man the more frequently such calls on hospitality take place. In one home where I lived, such visits during the summer and fall months occurred on an average of twice a week. Coon relates that hospitality can be pressed to the point where the host will act unseemly and even refuse entrance (1931:116). Within the limits of reasonable

556 request and frequency of demand, the better-off familes have
576 the social obligation of providing for any itinerant traveler,
574 whether he be teacher, student, or pilgrim. The exchange is, of course, not one-sided. By providing for men engaged in religious pursuits one enhances one's own piety and reputation within the community. The travelers also provide sources of news and gossip and on occasion religious instruction.

556 An analogous obligation which involves persons within the
554 community rather than strangers is that of the protector. In
571 modern times this has meant that certain prominent men in each Berber community have the social duty of acting as intermediary between the people of the community and the external government, or in effect between the fellah and the Caid. Caids, as the most
631 immediate representatives of the Moroccan state at the local
692 level, are given certain judicial powers. They can adjudicate marketplace disturbances such as thievery or fighting. They can have any man in their district brought in by the soldiers assigned to them. They can assess fines and imprison a man for up to five days without a judicial hearing (sentences of longer duration can only be assessed by the secular qadi in Alhucemas or Targuist). If judicial action of this sort is taken against
631 a member of the community his family will go to a prominent local
692 man. By making presents of goods or animals to this man, he is
556 placed in the position of protector and is under traditional
554 obligation to intercede on behalf of the petitioners. This form
571 of mutual support between local lords and the community was much

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631 692 556 554 571 more dramatic in the days of blood feuding when the same mechanism was used to acquire allies. The interference of a locally prominent man is generally efficacious since government representatives attempt to minimize local hostility. An open confrontation between a local lord and a state representative generally leads to the dismissal of the latter. In neither of the two locations where I spent extended periods of time did the caid stay in office while I was there. In one of the two fractions the caid changed three times. The balance of political power is weighted towards the locally prominent, for the lords of the old bled-as-siba represent the highest rung of the informal but powerful traditional structure of leadership while the caids and pashas represent the lowest level of the other form of government, the formal bureaucracy.

641 648 556 619 The national government is well aware of the actual dual organization of political power in the country. While every Moroccan may have equal status based on constitutional law, he does not have equal status in terms of customary law. This social fact is exemplified by the ceremonies held in Rabat where dignitaries from all across Morocco are called upon to attend such celebrations as the King's birthday, Aid al-Kebir, or the promulgation of a new law. On such occasions, depending upon the size of the tribe or fractions, one, two, or three men who represent the traditional power structure are royally commanded to be in attendance. Such meetings are ritualized reenactments of the loyalty of the populace as expressed through its local leadership.

641 To partake in such leadership requires wealth since the trip
648 itself is expensive (the only form of public transportation
556 from the Rif to Rabat is by bus and these men eschew this in
619 favor of splitting the expense of a taxi ride of several hundred
(494) miles) and the per diem allowance is more a token than anything realistic.

Some men have gracefully retired from positions of community leadership because of expenses such as these. If over a period of years one declines to go to such ceremonies because of ill health or pressing familial affairs, the person is quietly dropped from the list of the invited and another local man is
556 substituted. Expenses for maintaining such a social position are not small in relationship to the amount of wealth available even to the better-off Berber. On the other hand, wealth alone does not qualify one for a position of political prominence and social prestige. The importance of a man is based not on his wealth per se but rather what sort of wealth it is and how he came by it. Wealth divorced from such critical factors cannot be translated by the Riffian into socially meaningful significance. To operate within the context of profit is to operate outside the complex of social responsibility and communal solidarity. Thus while there are entrepreneurs in the Rif, they do
556 not have the social prestige that goes with traditional wealth
472 in land. This distinction could be illustrated by numerous examples but the following cases were selected because they

556 illustrate that this distinction is recognized not only within
472 the community but by outside authorities.

556 a) A tribesman of the Beni Said had migrated to Alhucemas
485 and worked for Spaniards during the Protectorate. He
472 had purchased the hotel of a Spaniard when the latter
[275] sold on the eve of national independence. While it is
[784] illegal for a Muslim to operate a bar, he continued to
do so with tacit approval from local officials. He
opened several other enterprises accommodating Berber
transients and Western tourists. Although he came from
a poor family he had accumulated considerable capital.
However, his values were oriented almost entirely to
city life and he visited his tribe only once or twice
a year. He did not attempt to translate any of his
556 economic power into social status in his tribe. When
485 an European-sponsored hotel opened in the city, the
472 management regarded this entrepreneur as a competitive
477 threat (he was underselling the new hotel by 50%).
They complained to the police (it was rumored that
generous bribes were offered and accepted) and they
promptly closed the Riffian's bar. He complained to
the Ministry of Interior in Rabat and was told he could
reopen once the tourist season was over.

556 b) A Berber of the Beni Wariyaghar was the son of a
prominent man who had sided with the Spanish against
Ab-del Krim. The man, although he held political office

556 under the Spanish, remained more or less a part of his tribe. His son continued to accumulate wealth [423] [425] but exclusively in terms of land, especially from Spaniards leaving the country. He maintained daily contact with his tribe, attended weddings of the more important people within the Beni Wariyaghar and although he lived in the city of Alhucemas, had close and intense connections with the countryside. This man's own son, an officer in the army, was [689] [625] visiting Alhucemas and was accused by the police chief of drinking in a public place. The police chief, a recent transfer from the southern zone, was unaware of the prominence of the boy and had him arrested. As soon as his father heard of this he obtained the immediate release of his son through the Ministry of Interior and the suspension of the police chief.

These two examples are illustrative of the fact that wealth itself is not correlated with prestige or power. One might even suggest that analytically there are two sorts of wealth, each based on a different sort of operation in terms of accumulation and distribution. One sort of wealth, that which derives from the land, is a part of a greater complex in which social factors motivate economic action. The other sort of wealth generally operates free of these social factors and is motivated by the profit incentive.

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556 It is possible, of course, for a single individual to
472 incorporate both a spirit of entrepreneurship and of tradition
183 in his activities. However, such a combination is difficult because the principle of profit is basically antagonistic to the principle of self-effacement and communal solidarity. The entrepreneur stands in a different relationship to the community than most of its other members. His pursuit of profit is an individualistic goal and there is a proverb among the Kabylia Berbers which with equal justice can be applied to the Rif, ". . . only the devil [Chit'an] says 'I' . . ." (Bourdieu 1965: 210). In such a society, individual initiative in the realm of capital gain or income-producing investment may be financially remunerative but of negative value in terms of social interrela-
556 tions. Those men who are motivated by profit often find the
472 atmosphere of the rural community uncongenial and they migrate
183 to Alhucemas or Targuist. While Riffians who live in the rural
521 areas may be covetous of some of the advantages which accrue to
369 the urban dweller such as electricity and running water, they
186 are contemptuous of the faster pace, the crowded conditions, the separation from the soil, and the dishonesty, with which they associate the city businessman.

556 There is, I think, a quite clear cleavage between the
472 ideology which guides the Riffian in his economic action and
521 that which guides the entrepreneur. The difference is mani-
577 fested in all sorts of practical arrangements such as credit, contract, investment, and so forth. It is due to the fact that

556 the profit incentive is entirely secondary to the social incen-
472 tive. In order to understand these differences more clearly,
571 let us examine the process by which an investment is made by
577 both the tribal peasant and the entrepreneur.

556 In order to make an investment some sort of capital must
454 be available, either through savings or acquired by credit. The
231 most common form of savings among the fellah is in the form of
471 livestock. Livestock in this society, however, is encumbered with certain values that savings in an industrial society do not generally possess. For one thing, livestock is heavily committed to meet ceremonial expenses. It is also a highly visible form of savings and consequently has a symbolic value in terms of prestige. By assigning such resources to capital development the fellah weakens his traditional position in the
556 community. Another form of savings is jewelry, which can be
30 regarded as cash storage. While jewelry has this potential in
454 the Rif, it is rather difficult to translate into a function.
[422] Jewelry is a woman's possession passed on from mother to daughter. Although many men are wont to utilize their wives' jewelry for increasing cash reserves, they cannot readily do so. Many of the women hoard their jewelry in their mothers' houses in order to assure that it stays in their possession. This form of wealth is regarded as an inviolable possession of the female and as such has definite cultural barriers to its being used as savings.

452 Another form of financing expenses for investment is through obtaining credit. Credit in the Rif, however, is based

452 on a quite different system with its own ideology than that which obtains in an industrial society or even among urban Moroccans. In an industrial society credit is based on tangibles, on some form of material good which has roughly an equivalent value to the loan. In the Rif the majority of transactions involving the 452 554 extension of credit are guaranteed by a personal and intangible factor, one's social status and prestige. A man's reputation, the social credits he has accumulated, the ones his father and grandfather established, are his most valuable assets. A man who has established such social credit can draw on financial resources much broader than those available to the man without it. Because he supports the integrity of the community, he can draw on the community reserve with no greater guarantee than his word. One man, a quite humble fellah, financed his son's wedding with three loans, of $150 apiece, from a brother, the son of a deceased brother, and a friend. He was able in this manner to hold a wedding ceremony of considerable elegance with over five hundred guests. In another case, in which a young man wished to marry against his father's wishes, he could find almost no financing within the community except from returning migrant labor youths. Among this latter class the traditional ideology has [177] [464] been diluted by the industrial experience. These migrants have introduced a certain amount of novelty, especially in the material culture. Whether they shall also exert an influence in traditional social relationships and modes of social organization remains to be seen.

454 Just as acquiring the capital for an investment has its own distinct forms, the actual investment itself appears to be motivated more often than not by social incentive rather than by profit. Aside from such investments as were mentioned in Chapters 3 and 4, we encounter investments which have, from the standpoint of industrial ideology, a more utilitarian aspect. 231 Thus, an extra mule or an ox can raise the level of productivity 454 of its owner. What more often occurs, however, is that in the 433 case of such prestige-laden animals, their effect is primarily 554 in the role of prestige and only secondarily in production. Perhaps the most dramatic representation of such investment are the animals which are purchased during the summer months. It is during this period that traveling is at its optimum, and owners leave their newly acquired livestock grazing conspicuously along the roadside for the public to observe. Unfortunately, work animals serve almost no productivity function during the summer months. With the commencement of winter, fodder supplies decrease and it becomes necessary to sell the extra animal before it can be put to a utilitarian purpose.

256 Another example of the primacy of the social incentive is 435 the business of milling. The turbine wheel mill powered by water 472 is one of the few nonagricultural enterprises which the fellah [376] engage in. The operation of a mill in the Rif bears little resemblance to the operations of a firm as a profit-making organization. In the first instance, cost for the service of a mill is not determined by any market factor, but by custom. The owner of

256 the mill collects a tenth of all the flour he processes, regard-
435 less of the level of demand or any market condition. While mills
472 are not economically competitive with one another, they are soci-
256 ally competitive. As one informant put it: "My father was better
472 than his, my grandfather better than his grandfather. If he has
477 a mill, why shouldn't we?" If there is only one mill in a local-
ity, which is a fairly rare circumstance, the entire community
uses it. However, if there are two or more mills, the basis of
[571] preference on the part of the users is not determined by conveni-
[578] ence of location of the mill but in terms of social factors such
[602] as either ancient antagonisms stemming from the blood feuds of
the past or familial alliance based on marriage or kinship.

423 Just as social motives and strictures lie behind the uses
427 of capital, so too do they influence the regulation of labor.
We see this in a series of sharecropping associations which arise
between a man who has more property than he alone can personally
cultivate (or who is prohibited from manual labor by his social
and/or religious status, such as some shorfa) and a person who
holds less land than he can cultivate to meet the subsistence
needs of his family. The latter may or may not be a property
holder, although usually he does have a small plot of his own.
Land fragmentation through the peculiarities of Islamic inher-
itance has, however, reduced many plots to sizes too small to
meet such subsistence needs as a family requires. In these cir-
[464] cumstances the Riffian hires out to those who have managed to
keep larger estates or have acquired land through purchase.

423 The number of men under such association is difficult to estimate
427 though I have the impression it is large. No man whom I inter-
464 viewed who might be roughly classified as a leader in the community had less than one person working for him in such a relationship.

427 The most prominent and common association is that of the
464 akhammas or sharecroppers. The akhammas is a laborer who voluntarily contracts to contribute all the physical labor necessary for the total production process of a piece of land. The landowner provides the land itself, the seed, fertilizer, plough and any other equipment, and the animal power. The akhammas provides all labor, from the initial ploughing to the ultimate harvesting. [465] For his services he receives exactly one-fifth of the yield, [466] hence the name which derives from hamsa or 'five.' The akhammas also receives the hand-me-down clothes of the master and often a meal each day. Since the activities of the akhammas entail his
427 constant presence around or even inside the household, he has far
464 greater access to the wives of notables than other males. A man
562 of sufficient wealth to employ an akhammas would probably isolate his wife from contact with male society. It is a myth that the Berbers do not seclude their women. The only ones who are not secluded from male society are the wives of poor men who must contribute their labor to the production process. Such women are, of course, the vast majority. The akhammas has more contact with the wives of the notable class than any other male not closely related to the family. Since the akhammas must consult

427 the wife about household tasks and often takes his meals inside
464 the central patio, he is on rather intimate (for the Rif) terms
562 with these women. In such a close and anomalous situation, there
[602] is a preference on the part of the master to hire a poor relative, especially of his wife, as a servant. By hiring a man of the wife's family or of a family which includes the wife's relatives by marriage, one lessens the danger of too close a relationship between wife and akhammas.

427 While both partners in the akhammas arrangement seek to
464 establish a contract which is divorced from social conflict over
466 women, they are nonetheless in basic conflict along incipient
465 class lines. The akhammas, at least in the contemporary situa-
565 tion, regards himself as being exploited by his patron in that the wage scale is fixed and involves difficult manual labor without any guarantees of remuneration. While he is free to negotiate his contract with whomever he so desires, his wage depends directly on the size of the crop yield for any one year. The master with greater reserves of resources suffers only an inconvenience if the crop yield is low. The sharecropper, on the other hand, has few if any reserves, and any reduction in the portion of his share has serious repercussions on his ability to maintain his household. The akhammas is especially aware of the inequity of this arrangement as wage opportunities open up and he becomes aware that salary can be negotiated with commensurate rewards in cash. Most ikhammasen prefer to get into the category of wage

laborer, especially as a migrant worker in Europe or Algeria, where salaries are high by Riffian standards.

On the other end of the spectrum are the landowners who regard the akhammas as the true beneficiary of the association. They argue that since they provide all the elements of production except labor, they are being exploited by the working class. The akhammas provides only his manual labor for a few weeks of ploughing and again for a few weeks at harvest time. Their contention is that although the work is arduous, it spans over a relatively short period of time for which the akhammas receives enough to meet his subsistence needs for the year. The remainder of the year the akhammas is free to contract for such labor as is available. The property owner, however, depends exclusively on his crop and thus does not have the additional revenues which the worker earns throughout the rest of the year. If the crop yield is low, the master will always see to it that the worker gets something, and besides the poor can apply for government relief while the rich can not. I suggested to several owners that they [123] engage a wage laborer for the short duration of actual work involved in performing the cultivation tasks but was met with only stony silence at the notion of such a scheme. I did not encounter and no one ever spoke of an instance in which agricultural labor was paid for in daily or weekly wages. Since the property class is in a position to change the system but does not, presumably the akhammas arrangement works to their benefit.

464 Although the akhamas association is the most prevalent,
465 it is only one of several such arrangements. Another sort of laborer is the amkari, who is hired for sowing and odd jobs about the house. His salary is not fixed and he is apparently paid in cash and clothing (Hart 1956:75). Another type of traditional
[233] work association is the amikhan, who is a youth employed to herd a man's goats and sheep. He ". . . is hired for a fixed period . . . [and] gets a non-stipulated sum at the end of his contract" (Hart, ibid.:75). Such an arrangement is graphically portrayed in Bowles' translation of Charhadi's autobiographical novel, A Life Full of Holes. Another form of association is the arabba' who cultivates household gardens, orchards, and trees. He is given a fourth of the fruit and vegetable crops; if the terrain is difficult to terrace, his portion is adjusted (Hart 1956:75).
[256] Most mill owners employ an assistant to do the grinding, and from the mill owner's portion the worker receives a fourth of the grain.

The common element of this sort of association seems to be that the salary the laborer earns is determined by customary regulations rather than by the supply and demand of workers. It
[571] is an association between the elite and the poor which is based
[565] on a fixed compensation and outside of any regulation by the market economy.

675 A correlate of this situation in which commercial arrangements are based on social factors is the irrelevance of written contracts. Whereas contractual agreement forms the basis of most

675 commercial transactions in an industrial society, legal surety in the Rif tends to be based on prestige, reputation, and status. Rights, privileges, duties, immunities, and liabilities are mostly non-contractual (excluding land titles and marriage documents). 675 466 464 Thus working associations between the wealthier and poorer men of the community, whereby a laborer who provides all the work on another man's piece of property and receives one-fifth of the crop, are always verbal agreements. Likewise, agreements over such a critical area as water rights, including the rotation of rights of irrigation, are exclusively verbal. Partnerships, pledges, leases, warranties and so forth are rarely 'paperized' but based, rather, on verbal agreement.

556 554 182 183 [128] In this chapter I have attempted to demonstrate how the social and cultural configuration of Berber existence affects the accumulation and distribution of wealth. Among the Riffians wealth as an abstract has little meaning. Wealth gains significance when it is an attribute of prestige (although prestige does not depend entirely on wealth). Prestige is gained from living by the code of the community and fulfilling one's obligations to the community. Those who fulfill such obligations have political prestige both in the realm of the Berber community and outside it. A direct consequence of this is that profit as a system of motivation has little operative or analytic value in determining what happens to material goods. Resources are not 'free'; they cannot be allocated in a social vacuum to obtain maximum financial rewards. On the contrary, resources are socially 'bound' by

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183 the fact that the society disapproves of any action which disrupts the solidarity of the community.

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Chapter 6

THE MARKETPLACE

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443 While the preceding chapters have been devoted to distribution of wealth according to imperatives or bias arising from the social conditions of Berber life, this concluding section is devoted to exchanges which take place within the market. In it I describe the composition of the market and the interactions of its participants. I conclude with an analysis of the role of the local market in the economic and social life of the Riffian and in what ways the local Berber economy articulates with the national economy of Morocco. By doing this I hope to present a coherent picture of the integration between the indigenous exchange system and the larger national economy.

443 The characteristic form of the market, or suq, in the Rif is for buyers and sellers to come together once a week at a permanent location within each tribe or large tribal section. By holding their markets on separate days, the tribes have produced a system of staggering weekly markets all across the Rif. [196] Thus a merchant can travel to a different suq every day of the week except Friday, the Muslim sabbath. The fellah, however, rarely engage in any market activity except at the local suq. A study of the reasons behind this will divulge many of the

443 pertinent features of the marketplace and its importance in the economy of the Rif.

443 182 571 The market in the Rif does not function simply to facilitate exchange but serves a whole series of social needs of the fellah. By looking at the noneconomic functions of the market we can better understand why a man will ride a mule or walk for two hours to market, yet make only a single purchase. We will understand why a seller would prefer to deal in a familiar market although other markets may have higher prevailing prices for his goods. The market has both an economic and a social function and it is difficult to say which has primacy over the other. As Montagne points out, "Le montagnard ne se rend pas au 'souq' uniquement pour acheter ou vendre, il y vient souvent aussi pour rencountrer ses amis, réglar des contestations de terrain ou de pâturage, ou plus simplement encore pour connaître les nouvelles du jour" (1930:249). And Bourrilly has noted the importance "non soulement économique mais encore politique, de ces souks ruraux. Ces rendez-vous périodiques, que des liens d'hospitalité, tels que la zettata [a promise of safe passage], rendent plus forts, aboutissent forcément à une fusion plus ou moins complète des groupes qui fréquentent les marchés voisins" (1932:216).

Only by observing the noneconomic significance can we avoid the type of thinking that led Albéniz to conclude that ". . . poco a poco van disminuyendo el número de zocos en el territorio, como consecuencia de la bondad de las vías de comunicación. Los zocos de escasa vida se ven absorbidos por los de auge más intenso, y

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443 los indígenas, por sí mismos, van señalando, con su ausencia e
182 inhibición, cuáles son los que deben desaparecer" (1930:122).
571 Or as Mikesell argues, improved communications and the bus favor the growth of large regional markets over the local one. "The simple charms of the local suq lose their appeal when larger markets with a wider range of goods are accessible" (Mikesell 1958:509).

443 Aside from the fact that market appeal is not based on
182 "simple charms," I think both Albéniz and Mikesell have founded
114 their conclusions on a false evaluation of the purposes of the market. When an institution serves multiple purposes it cannot easily be replaced by another institution which serves a single purpose. The large, impersonal regional market does not fulfill the social function of the local suq. Even as a source for supplying the fellah, the regional market has only a marginal value since most purchases are of articles (kerosene, tea, tobacco, etc.) whose value does not appreciably alter from market to market. Indeed, Mikesell elsewhere recognizes that from a buying standpoint one market is as good as another. "Everyone has a turn with the itinerant peddlers, but few purchase anything; for in this area of subsistence economy each family guards its currency for a marriage or some other special event" (1958:503).

443 But it is especially the social functions of the market
182 which reinforce the fellah's loyality to his local suq. It is
571 here that he can maximize his advantages of being part of a status economy. Here he can seek out local notables to assist him.

443 182 57 [452] [594] He can get credit in the local shops on the basis of his reputation. Here he can consult relatives and friends, settle petty disputes, arrange marriages and sell property. His ties to the marketplace do not depend on "improved communication" but on a whole series of both economic and noneconomic involvements with the local market.

443 182 What is the nature then of this local market? I shall try to arrive at a picture of the common elements of all suqs of the Rif, although there will be slightly different elements or emphasis in each specific suq. As Bourrilly comments, "L'importance de ces souks varie naturallement avec l'importance des régions qu'ils desservent, de la clientèle qu'ils attirent, des zones de production dont ils sont le débouché" (1932:211). Still, after spending many weary days in such places one cannot help but sympathize with Albéniz: "Visto y descrito uno cualquiera de ellos, están vistos y descritos los demás" (1930:118).

443 [651] [366] [312] Most of the markets are walled-in enclosures with only one or two openings, assuring the collection of market taxes. They are ideally located near a source of water so that animals can drink. Special places outside the walls are allocated for the quartering of mules and donkeys. Inside the market are rows of permanent structures, either small shops or cafes. On a non-market day the site will be deserted except for a few soldiers assigned to each market and a few tribesmen, sitting inside the canteens drinking tea.

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443 On the market day itself, this changes. Merchants arrive on bus, mule, truck, or foot to set up their booths. By eight o'clock there is a small but steady flow of fellah entering the
443 market. At the main entrances of the sug taxes are collected.
651 For those who have certain articles to sell, a tax must be paid,
438 based on the quantity of the commodity. There are certain cases, to be discussed below, when commoditfes may enter the market free to be taxed later, at the moment of sale or after the goods have been accumulated but before they leave the market.

443 The tax of the market is, at present, the main source of
651 revenue that the government realizes from the Rif. Both the
648 Spanish and Moroccan governments found that the collection of taxes on the basis of market exchange was the most feasible way of extracting revenue from the Rif.[1] By walling off the market and stationing guards at the entrances the government is able to impose a stability on the collection process. "Conviene senalar que la recaudación de los impuestos del Majken en los Zocos se viene realizando por las intervenciones militares sin el menor obstáculo y con mucha más facilidad que puede efectuarse en las ciudades la recaudación de los arbitrios urbanos" (Albéniz 1930:118-119).

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[1] The Spanish charged a tax (tertib) on the yield of the land and upon livestock. The tertib was discontinued after independence and a new tax "was so designed as to exempt the poorest 90 percent of farmers" (Morocco 1965:394). This excludes most of the fellah. For a discussion of the Spanish tax structure in Morocco see Hart 1956:253.

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443 Below is the official tax rate of the Spanish as given
651 in Albéniz (1930:121-122). I have no schedule of my own because
648 of a disinclination on the part of officials to give me such
438 information.
[123]

Articles upon which a tax is paid entering the market:

A load of fruit	0.75 Spanish pesetas
Basket of vegetables	0.75
Basket of fish	1.50
Kilo of honey or butter	0.40

Articles upon which a tax is paid upon leaving the market by the large-scale buyers:

Wool	5% of total value
Straw mats	0.25 each
Dried cereal	0.50 quintal
Goat or lamb hide	0.20 each
Cattle hide	0.50 each

Articles upon which a tax is paid at the moment of exchange:

Horses	5% of the value of the sale
Mules	5% of the value of the sale
Donkeys	5% of the value of the sale
Firewood, a quintal	5% of the value of the sale

Articles upon which a tax is charged when entering the market and again upon being sold:

Basket of wool	.10 and .20
Chickens and wild fowl	.10 and .10
Eggs (dozen)	.10 and .10
Carbon (a sack)	.10 and .10

443 While Albéniz's list follows the general lines of present taxing
651 policy, there have been some changes aimed at helping the poor.
648 For example, small lots of fruit, vegetables, nuts and eggs can
438 enter the market without paying a duty. Revenue is collected for
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[735] such items if they are purchased by the large middlemen merchants who pay the tax upon leaving the suq. Because of governmental tax and conservation laws, carbon is rarely sold in the free market but rather in the black market. The narcotic kif, which
[276] undoubtedly is a major trade item, also is in the province of the black marketeer. Missing from Albéniz's list are almonds, which have become an increasingly important cash crop. Almonds enter the market free in small lots, are bought by large-scale merchants and taxed upon departing from the market.

443 After paying his tax, the seller enters the market and goes to the area occupied by traders of his particular commodity. There are no market rules demanding that a seller go to a special place but areas have by custom been developed for each type of goods. Those people selling an unusual commodity or unique service set up shop wherever they desire as long as it does not interfere with the operation of the market.

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438 In the following I shall outline the sorts of commodities brought to the market and the categories of people involved in marketing them. The composition of the agricultural products varies greatly with the season. Tomatoes, green peppers, and other vegetables are available only in the summer and early fall. For a short period during the fall, fruit is in overabundance. Potatoes, maize, garlic, and onions appear throughout the year, though again the supply varies. There are always large stacks of unmilled barley even though this is supposed to be the main crop of the region. That the fellah have to buy barley on

443 438 occasion is some indication of the poverty of the land in which they live.

Throughout the year there are long rows of hardware and spice booths where a wide variety of non-indigenous products are sold, including cakes of soap, toothpaste, mirrors, nails, locks, cooking utensils, drinking glasses, matches, and plastic jewelry. [263] The spices include red pepper, paprika, black pepper kernels, stick cinnamon, curry, and saffron. Off in another section are men selling blankets, rugs, and clothing, both new and old. [291] [197] While men can buy both Western and traditional clothes, the only type of dress available for women is traditional. It is perhaps fortunate that the native dress is so loose-fitting, since the men purchase these garments for their wives with only the roughest notion of sizes. There are also people selling [372] [373] articles made from cane or palmetto--brooms, baskets, and so forth, as well as vendors of kerosene, the only source of light for the fellah. Outside the market is a specially walled-off area, the livestock market; there cows, goats, and sheep are sold. Some of these are bought directly by the butchers who prepare the meat for immediate sale; others are sold to merchants who transport the animals to the richer province of Nader where they are fattened for resale.

443 445 463 231 In addition to these merchants, there are people who have a service to sell. Included in these are the butchers, who are perhaps the most prominent of this group in that they handle the largest volume of business. They arrive early at the market,

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443 buy animals from the local tribesmen, have them inspected by a
445 local official (a practicante; there is no word in tamazight for
463 this innovation introduced by the Spanish), kill them, cut the
231 meat up and sell it. Since it is impractical for most Riffians
[556] to kill an animal for meat unless there is a special social
occasion, this service of packaging meat in small lots provides
the better-off fellah family with the only meat it eats during
[735] the week. The poor, of course, cannot even afford this luxury.
443 Besides the butchers, there are also barbers, blacksmiths, sol-
445 derers, shoe repairmen, and food vendors. The latter consist
[265] of a group of men located to one side of the market who prepare
[785] and sell fried green peppers, eggs, and sardines. They are the
[796] market group most severely affected by the religious month of
Ramadan, since eating food during the days of that month is pro-
hibited, and they go on a monthlong vacation. People engaged in
445 services of this sort, iron workers, blacksmiths, shoe repairmen,
565 and weighers of grain, form a special social class of imziren,
or shameless ones. Such public occupations, while necessary,
are socially disapproved of and members of this group are thought
to have relinquished all connections with their tribe and are
wandering about from market to market in search of a living.
445 The most common explanation (given by the fellah not the imziren)
565 for their being where they are is that they have lost their land
423 sometime in the past and must engage in such occupations. Since
loss of land through feuding did take place, this explanation is
plausible. On the other hand, some imziren musicians with whom

445 565 423 I have discussed this claim to possess land in distant tribes but find their occupation more remunerative.

443 445 In addition to these small merchants there is an assortment of people who turn up at irregular intervals to sell special goods or services. Thus we have the photographer with his Polaroid camera, the seller of Viewmasters and slides, the itinerant dentists who pull teeth out with their pliers, the bookseller, the watch repairman, the palm reader, the magician. (759) The greatest attention goes to the medicine man or woman, occasionally selling medical drugs, but more often magical herbs, stones, parts of animals, and powders. The officials on the whole disapprove of these latter, but will tolerate them inside the marketplace unless they become too vociferous or make too extravagant a claim. This whole group, while it often provides the most excitement or novelty of the market, is rather peripheral to the volume of trade that takes place.

442 443 472 Finally there are the large-scale buyers and sellers, the commercial entrepreneurs who have acquired sufficient capital so that short-run setbacks do not greatly affect the operation, who operate not only apart from the local economy but also apart from the regional economy. These are the middlemen between two different economic spheres, who operate with equal efficiency in both. Of course, a large-scale buyer in one market might well turn up in another market as a large-scale seller. Thanks to the limited range of diversification in the markets of the Central

442 Rif, such multiplicity of roles does not turn up empirically and
443 we may proceed to regard the one as different from the other.
472 Of the large-scale sellers in the markets, the fish trade
[262] has become the most prominent, selling a commodity which, though
cheaper than meat, serves as an important dietary item. Alhucemas
226 has only recently become a prominent fishing port, currently
[504] rivaled by only Agadir on the Atlantic. The fishing occupation,
[178] while pursued by the Thimsamen and Ibuqquyen tribes for several
[648] centuries, has only recently been modernized. During the Spanish
protectorate this activity was mainly in the hands of Spaniards
but ever-increasing numbers from the two above tribes have entered
442 into this occupation. The fishermen themselves do not market
443 their catch but, after spending the night out at sea, bring the
472 catch to the docks where middlemen bargain for it. These men,
438 in turn, supply every market in the Central Rif with fish on the
appropriate day of each market. Such an enterprise is usually
carried on by a company of several men who band together to buy
a truck and split the rewards in common. Prior to the building
of roads this enterprise was conducted on a very small scale by
entrepreneurs who traveled into the interior on mules. At present
[262] the activity has picked up to the extent that every market gets
two or three loads of fish, mainly sardines which are the cheapest
fish available and take the place of meat in the diets of the
poor.

443 Another group of large-scale sellers who come to the local
442 <u>suqs</u> are the barley merchants who purchase grain in the richer
438

province of Nader, where barley is relatively cheap, in order to sell in the Rif, which seldom produces enough to meet local needs. The barley is stacked in huge piles of loose, unground seed which is purchased in relatively small lots to be taken back to the mountains and ground for bread or left in seed form to feed the livestock. The barley is measured and weighed by a member of the imziren class, who loudly cries out the current price of barley in the market. The merchants themselves sit under nearby shade trees, accepting the coins from their criers and listening to the competition.

In addition to these large-scale sellers, there are the large-scale buyers, who resemble the large-scale sellers in all particulars except their immediate function in the market. Among this group are the egg merchants who buy the tiny lots of a myriad fellah in order to transport them to the urban centers of Tetuan or Fez. Another group of buyers are the almond merchants who purchase the Riffian's supply to market abroad, usually in France, to cosmetic companies which transform them into face oils and hand lotions. There are also merchants of oranges who supply the canned juice industry, and grape buyers who purchase the indigenous supply (used locally by the Berbers as a winter reserve in the form of raisins) for the wine industry located in central Morocco.

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Composition of the Market of Arba Taurirt, 1965

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Commodity	Vendors Sept. 15	Vendors Nov. 10	Commodity	Vendors Sept. 15	Vendors Nov. 10
kerosene	6	8	barbers	11	9
rugs	8	7	solderers	3	2
pottery	1	1	shoe repair	9	6
baskets, brooms, and straw hats	4	0	butchers	11	9
men's new clothes	13	12	food for consumption at market	12	10
men's used clothes	7	4	medicine	1	0
women's clothes	x	27	photography	1	0
hardware and spices	29	27	dentist	1	0
barley	8	7	palm reader	0	1
bread	1	2	jewelry	0	1
candy	4	4	rubber boots	0	1
window frames	1	1	belts	0	1
books	1	1	magician	0	1
soft drinks	1	0			
trucks of fish	3	1			
garlic	a	a	turnips	0	a
peppers	a	0	eggs	a	a
almonds	a	0	melons	1	0
walnuts	1	0	grapes	a	0
oranges	0	a	tomatoes	a	0
raisins	0	a	potatoes	a	a
			onions	a	a

a] indicates that the number of vendors was so large and changeable that accurate counting was not possible.

x] indicates that I have no sure figures.

This list includes, to the best of my knowledge, every single item being sold inside the marketplace. It was not possible to keep a tab on livestock transactions.

(114)

443 I shall now attempt to schematize the suq in the Central Rif. While this diagram may not include all classes of participants nor all exchanges, I think it covers the majority of all cases. The buyers and sellers in the weekly market can be divided into three separate categories. The first are the tribal fellah, rooted socially in the local community. Unquestionably, this group constitutes the vast majority of people at the suq. Whatever economic interaction they have with the suq is prompted by acquiring cash to finance social expenditures or to provide a limited range of goods such as cooking oil, kerosene, sugar, tea, salt and so forth, for household consumption. The majority of persons in this category, the poor fellah, have brought their small lots of goods derived from their agricultural activities to exchange at whatever the prevailing price in order to obtain cash for making equally small purchases. They do not seek to accumulate surpluses of cash so that they can market larger quantities of goods in successive market meetings.

443 442 434 435 The second category of people involved in any one market is made up of the large-scale merchants who have come to buy from the fellah. This group is completely impersonal, rarely if ever having any local connections with the populace. These merchants are well provided with capital, own their own trucks, and are knowledgeable about supply and demand conditions in both the local and national markets in which they operate. In the case of most large-scale buyers, they are accompanied by a group of hired men who seek out market information. These informants

443 gather up verbal information about the prevailing prices and the
442 supply of a commodity in the suq. Their operation is somewhat
434 more complex than the sellers who can quickly assess the supply
435 of the market since they need only evaluate the quantities of
their competitors. The large-scale buyers do not have such early
information and must rely on their "runners" to supply them with
market conditions on the inpouring of a commodity into the market.
The centers of these operations are quite exciting as information
pours into them and the merchant sends out his buying price.
443 While the lot size of his purchases is uniformly small (buying
442 from the numerous fellah who have only small lots to sell), the
large-scale merchant departs from the market with a sizable supply
442 of his good. At the end of market day he is assessed a tax based
[651] on the quantity he has purchased and transports the merchandise
to urban centers where even larger firms purchase the good either
to transform it into another sort of goods, through an industrial
or factory process, or to break it down into small lots again to
sell at a higher price. The principle behind his operation is
simple. By his act of transporting commodities away from the
area in which they were produced to another area in which they
are scarce, he multiplies the value of the goods.

443 Amongst themselves such buyers have a rather accurate idea
435 of the prevailing prices among their competitors at the market-
442 place. Whatever price differential that exists at the market
develops from the efficiency of information gathering. By this
word-of-mouth information the buyer is able to estimate market

443 conditions and adjust his prices accordingly. The fellah, on
442 the other hand, has no such information channel and merely
435 attempts to get the best price he can with his limited supply of information. The fellah sells his eggs, or almonds, or oranges, to the big buyers almost as soon as he contacts one of them at the marketplace. Since his lots are so small, any fluctuation in the price of the commodity during the day would only remotely affect him and he prefers to get his selling activity over with quickly so that he can get on to his other market activities--buying and social intercourse. It would be far from the market style of the Berber to spend hours prowling the suq in search of an optimum moment to sell. Only in those commodities which the producer sells directly to the consumer (fellah to fellah) is there much time spent in marketing goods. Only in the absence of the large-scale merchant must the tribesman await the disposition of his goods.

It is only on rare occasions that the large-scale merchant attempts to sell what he has bought in the same market. The only instances that I know of were in the case of selling to wholesalers or restaurant owners from the city of Alhucemas who came to the rural suqs to buy for their immediate need, taking advantage of special friendships and buying in lots so large that the price advantage for the large-scale merchants of transporting to another area was offset by the quantity of the purchase. This, however, was rare. Most merchants of this magnitude attempted to derive their profits through their transporting facility.

443 The third group is those merchants who exclusively sell
442 at the market. As noted above, this is merely an analytic device. Empirically, a buyer in one market will be a seller in another. It is only the special ecological conditions of the Rif which separate the two categories in the marketplaces. There is, however, a major dichotomy which splits this group, based mainly on scale of operation. On the one hand are the large-scale sellers who resemble, in terms of organization, the large-scale buyers and who derive their profit mainly through the transportational facility. On the other hand, we have the small-scale merchant who sells his goods and services only in a cycle of small local markets.

443 The small-scale sellers hold in common with the large merchants only the fact that their basic activity is to sell. The difference is essentially in scale. The small-scale merchant or occupational specialist travels from one market within a carefully defined region to the next market. He has no con-
(494) nections outside his immediate circuit and gets from one place
(492) to the next on public transportation or mule. He has little knowledge of market conditions outside his immediate view of
(435) a single market. His prices, which may involve a good deal of
(437) bargaining, vary only slightly from customer to customer and
443 from market to market. He may be divided into two empirical
445 categories: those who sell services, such as barbers, butchers, shoe repairmen, food vendors, blacksmiths, solderers, etc., and those who keep a small inventory of nonperishable goods, such

443 as clothes, kerosene, sandals, rugs, blankets, hardware, and
445 spices.

443 A final group of market participants is the shop and cafe
444 owners--those men who have purchased or inherited business shops which ring the market. Within such shops one can purchase most of the commodities that the fellah seeks for household consump-
443 tion. In all the marketplace, the only appearance of credit is
444 in such shops where, based on one's personal reputation, payments
452 can be spread into the future. With all the other participants
(439) of the suq, each transaction must be culminated by an exchange of cash for goods. It is only in the local shops and with local tribesmen that honour guarantees a purchase. In the Rif when people interact in the market yet are not part of the same community, payment has no guarantee except an immediate exchange of cash. In the shops the local fellah, if they have maintained trust, may purchase without money. As a shop owner explained to me: "We live in a poor country. How else could the people buy?" There is no interest charged on such credit.

443 These, then, are the perimeters of the marketplace. I
571 shall now discuss the functional relationships obtaining within
(128) this complex. By discovering who interacts and with what degree, we shall be in a better position to evaluate the role of the
442 Berber in the market. First, we note that the large-scale buyers
443 do not interact in the local markets with the large-scale sellers.
571 This is a function of size and transporting. Any firm operating at this magnitude in the markets of the Central Rif realizes its

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442 profit not from dispersing goods in the same marketplace but in
571 transporting the goods from one region to another.
[443]

Large-scale buyers interact with small-lot sellers in a limited range of goods which, generally, can be transformed by industrial processes into another commodity (grapes to wine, almonds to cosmetics, oranges to canned fruit), the conversion of which enhances the value of the original object. These buyers are plugged into a larger economy with export connections and are
442 sensitive to external conditions. Tribesmen who produce in order
433 to meet the demand of such buyers are likewise closely connected
434 with the national and international economy. There is a small but growing number of fellah who produce to sell to this group, but even among them there is a reticence to move completely into the commercial sector. My impression is that the great majority of the Riffian peasantry engaging in cash-cropping attempt to maintain a balance in their production schedule which continues to include a fair proportion of traditional crops. By generalizing their production, few of the grape specialists suffered from
[458] the decrease in prices during 1965. This contrasts with the one-
[435] crop estates in Algeria which during the same period suffered severe setbacks.

443 The small-scale sellers of both goods and services occupy that position which is left open by the unwillingness of the local Berber to engage in full-time commerce and the absence
[434] of the large-scale entrepreneur. They are, on the one hand, dealing in commodities or services the margin of profit on which

443 434 [438] [435] is too low for the large-scale merchants to intrude in competition. The type of commodity (clothes, kerosene, and so on) cannot be increased in value through combination and transportation, while at the same time the volume of trade is so sporadic and low that only the one-man operation can derive a living from it. We might assume that wherever there exists an adequate margin of profit through combination and increase in scale, the large-scale firm will preempt this position. The leftovers, so to speak, go to the small middleman operation. On the other hand, these small-scale merchants are performing services which have a low cultural value among the local population. Thus the small-scale seller of goods and services fills a vacuum. He cannot be displaced by the large firms, since it would not be profitable for them to compete with him. At the same time, he serves the local community by providing necessary but socially disapproved of services.

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Finally, the tribesmen interact amongst themselves-- 443 438 producers selling to household consumers. Since the fellah's trade is always in small lots (with the exception of livestock), most transactions in this sector are on a very small scale. Lack of capital and limited interest in the market characterize this group. Sellers seek to dispose of their product at whatever the prevailing price as quickly as possible. Buyers choose mainly in terms of quality of the commodity rather than price, which tends to be even--each seller listening to his neighbor seller and selling accordingly. There is very little differential in this group in product or price. The cause behind this lies,

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443 438 undoubtedly, in the fact that each production unit is a replica of all the other units. Each seller has the same commodities, in about the same proportions and selling for similar prices. Individual (A) has commodities x and y which he wishes to sell in order to buy z. Individual (B) has the same commodities which he seeks to dispose of in order to achieve the same goal. And so forth, throughout the whole of the assembled tribesmen. What exchange does take place among the fellah exists, for the most part, as a function of slight ecological differentiation between local areas.

The fellah, by and large, enters the market and disposes of his goods at whatever price they will fetch, either to fellow tribesmen or merchants from the outside. Naturally he seeks the best return that he can get, but his motivations lie far from the rest of the merchants who seek capital accumulation. His [437] desire is to acquire cash for tobacco, tea, sugar, cooking oil, kerosene, and a kilo of fish or meat, or to transfer his gain back into the status economy of which he is so much a part. He partakes of the selling process for only as long as it is absolutely necessary. Ideally, he should not even need to sell.

443 829 Unlike the peasants of many areas (Guatemala and Mexico come to mind), the average Riffian is not a "marketeer" and marketing is not a primary household activity. In an ethnographic study of the small village of San Antonino in Oaxaca, Mexico, I was impressed by the fact that everyone seemed to be deeply concerned about what went on in the market. Many of the

townsmen were traders who carried their vegetables and flowers on foot or bus to distant parts of the regional market in order to achieve maximum profits. The Riffian seeks only to make an exchange in his local market in order that he might get back to the more important aspects of his life.

Such exchange, however, is not without calculation. As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, the Berber goes to his local *suq* because it satisfies certain social needs. He likewise frequents the market because it offers him clear-cut economic advantage. It is here that he has acquaintances among the merchants, craftsmen and occupational specialists with whom he has certain guarantees, based on familiarity, that he will receive a fair price. Such assurance is absent in a foreign market. Invariably, the stranger pays more for a service or good than the regular customer. In the most important aspect of trade, that of livestock, this consideration is coupled with that of transportation. From the standpoint of seeking out the best price based on multiple competition, the larger the market, the better the prices. In the long run, the best price for animals exists in the larger markets and one knows beforehand that an animal sold in Had Ruadi or Arba Taurirt will fetch a lower price than at Beni Bu Iyash. Yet to sell in such a market the *fellah* is faced with almost insurmountable difficulties. Should he take his livestock--a goat tied across the back of his mule or a cow herded along on foot--to a market further than his local *suq*, he must return the animal home or be entirely

443 dependent on the prices existing in the market for that day.
438 On the other hand, if he is dissatisfied with the price in the
435 local market he can easily transport the beast home again, to
await a more propitious occasion.

443 I think that the major element which emerges from this
182 schematic presentation of the composition of the market and the
571 interaction of its various actors is that each fellah, as an individual, plays a relatively minor role in the workings of the market. The market brings together buyers and sellers, but the fellah have a different orientation than the other
443 buyers and sellers. Stemming from this difference in orienta-
182 tion is a basic difference in the form of economic activity. The primary concern of the professional merchant is to dispose of his products on the market, hopefully at a profit. The primary concern of the fellah is to meet subsistence and social needs. If he can do this by disposing of his crops or livestock on the market, all the better. But the market as such does not provide the dynamics of the Rif economy; the dynamics are provided by the impulses activated by the status economy.

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CONCLUSION

105 631 I shall now drew a résumé of the character of the Rif economy. The first factor which merits our attention is that the Rif was part of the bled-as-siba, the land of insolence, as opposed to the bled as-makhzen. The central feature of the 105 631 latter was that a central political body integrated the economy, 648 extracting taxes, channeling production, and supervising trade. The central government ran the economy which, with its large estates, absentee landowners, and tax-supported upper class, presented a classical example of an Oriental style of economic integration.

105 631 The bled-as-siba presents quite another form of political integration and economic organization.[1] Politically, the Rif consisted of a number of small sub-units, each autonomous from the rest and each relying only on its own power for maintaining its political integrity and economic well-being.

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[1] This holds true for only parts of the bled-as-siba. Other parts of the land outside the makhzen developed complex feudal political organization while at the same time remaining free of the Sultan. Examples from the current century include the Pasha of Marrakesh, el-Glaoui, and Raisuli in the northwest. As Benet noted, "The appearance of an internal proletariat in the Siba is a sure sign that it is developing an oligarchic tyranny of local character and a Makhzen of its own" (1957: 195).

105 631 The economic system of the bled-as-siba reflected this preoccupation, each sub-unit incorporating both its economic activity and its social activity in a manner so that the two could rarely be separated.

105 648 [631] [178] The Rif, however, is no longer bled-as-siba. Since 1926 it has been integrated into political systems with centralized authority. Yet most of the elements of the traditional economic system continue to persist. Why? I think that along with geographical isolation a poverty in natural resources has helped to maintain the Rif free from outside interferences. Sultans were hesitant to send a sizable army into the Rif because it was questionable whether the army could live off the land. Spain was interested less for economic reasons than as an effort to recoup some of the colonial glory she had but recently lost in a war with the United States. Once Spain established her protectorate she only selectively exploited the country in such items as minerals and lumber. On the whole this had no effect on the indigenous economic system. Nor has the Rif fared better since independence. "By comparison, the inhabitants of the old Spanish zone, largely Riffian, are poor relations when contrasted with their compatriots to the south. Extremely limited agricultural possibilities and poor communication in rugged terrain combine to produce this situation" (Steward 1964:170). The Moroccan government has found that the incorporation of the north constitutes a drain on national resources, contributing little to the national economy while at the same time extracting

105 a disproportionate share of the national income towards support-
648 ing the region. "On balance, the ex-Spanish zone brings little other than problems to the Moroccan administration and economy" (Ibid.:170).[1] Since it cannot be profitably exploited, the Rif is allowed to follow its own form of economic integration. This integration is based on an adaptation to the prevailing ecological and social conditions of the Rif. That the adaptation is successful is testified by its persistence.

105 In summary I shall sketch what seem to me the basic features of this economic system. I do not pretend that this is an exhaustive summation of all elements of the system nor is it adequate as a treatment of the new forms of economic organization which are emerging in the Rif (expanding wage labor, tourism, etc.). It does, however, serve as a guide towards understanding the major elements of this status economy and, it is hoped, deepens our perception of the economic life of nonindustrial society.

105 We may start with the element in the system which marks
43 the greatest point of departure from the economy of an industrial
182 society. Those resources of the fellah which are not devoted to subsistence are predominantly tied up in meeting needs arising from a combination of social and religious factors. Production

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[1] The same is said about the Kabylia in Algeria. Yet it is unlikely that independence in either country could have been achieved as quickly as it came without the assistance of these dissentient Berber groups. Unfortunately, once independence is achieved they become a burden to the urban-oriented leaders.

105 is not keyed to profit for the sake of capital accumulation or
43 reinvestment for expansion but rather to provide resources to
182 meet these needs. Motives for exchanges, transfers, consumption,
[152] etc. are based on 1) social obligations, 2) anticipation of spiritual or social reward, and 3) ritually prescribed ceremonies. These motives provide the dynamics of the internal economic
105 system. While there are markets in the Rif, the economy itself
443 is not integrated by the market. It is a society which Bohannan
182 and Dalton would characterize as consisting of "Communities with
[181] peripheral markets--that is, the institution of the market place is present, but the market principle does not determine acquisition of subsistence or the allocation of land and labor resources" (1965:5). Of course, this does not mean that markets are unimportant in the society. The market is an institutionalized way of bringing buyers and sellers together and redistributing resources. As such it merits our attention as much as non-market transactions. Yet it is organizationally distinct from our own economy in which "All goods and services, including the use of labor, land and capital are available for purchase in markets and have, therefore, a price; all forms of income derive from the sale of goods and services--wages, rent and interest, respectively, appearing only as different instances of price according to the items sold" (Polanyi 1957:247). In the Rif the market acts as only one, and not necessarily the most predominant, focal point for exchanges. Only by exploring the com-
[114] plete range of exchanges can we avoid the sort of ethnographic

105 443 182 114 blindness that led Benet to conclude: "Everything that is not domestically produced has, therefore, to be obtained from the market, through market transactions, and no exchange or commercial activities of any kind are attempted outside of these times and places. The market place has a monopoly on exchange transactions [amongst Berbers]" (1957:196).

105 443 441 182 434 438 The market itself is not the area of primary concern for the fellah. Professional merchants, of course, fall into another category. But there is little impetus for the growth of an indigenous merchant class. The merchant entrepreneur is, by definition, acting in a way which runs counter to the status economy. He is primarily concerned with devoting his capital to profit or income-producing investments. While the peasant comes to the market with commodities to exchange for money to buy other commodities, the merchant seeks to convert money into commodities which he can resell in order to acquire more money. Social and religious imperatives only interfere with the merchant's freedom of action.[1] Unlike transactions in the social sphere which perpetuate themselves into the future as part of a web of reciprocal obligations, the merchant seeks transactions which are impersonal and terminal at the moment of exchange. He is most at home in the suq, where these conditions are nearest to being achieved.

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[1] I do not mean to draw too close a parallel between the Protestant merchant and his Muslim counterpart. The Islamic business ethic still awaits its Weber.

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182 Yet at the same time, the merchant becomes increasingly isolated from the culture of the Rif and increasingly involved in the ideology of industrial society.

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182 Outside the marketplace, resources continue to be circumscribed by social strictures, credit is based on reputation, prestige is evoked through ceremony, while honor and shame guarantee each transaction. Bulls are killed to bring on rain, witches paid to remove evil eyes, and man continues an intensive dialogue with his external environment based on a cultural evaluation which provides a measure of both social and physical comfort.

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[For additional information on Riffian "fractions" see also Category 634.]

[For information on the councils (jemas) on the ar-rba or tribal level, see Category 619.]